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INTRODUCTION 
O’ Hara (1995) defines market transparency as “the ability of market participants to observe 
information about the trading process”.  It entails pre-trade transparency (i.e. display of order 
book information: bid and ask quotations and market depths), post-trade transparency (i.e. 
public and timely dissemination of trade information: execution time, volume, price and 
direction of trades) and anonymity (i.e. information about the identity of brokers submitting 
orders either pre- or post-trade).  
 
From a general point of view, all securities regulators advocate the importance to have highly 
transparent financial markets. Such environments, in fact, facilitate the price formation 
process, encourage investors to trust the market and participate, ensure best execution. In 
addition, they guarantee the fairness of trading and increase market participants’ awareness in 
making decisions.  
Also the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, when identifying the causes of the Great 
Recession, acknowledged the stabilizing effect of market transparency. The lack of 
transparency magnified the dangers of the heavy debt taken on by financial institutions, 
spreading the panic among investors
1
.  
 
Despite being generally desirable, when we come to consider transparency as a market design 
feature its implications on market quality become unclear.  
In the evaluation of the adequacy of transparency arrangements in the UK secondary bond 
markets, the Financial Services Authority stated: “Transparency is not an end in itself. Total 
transparency is not necessarily optimal, and appropriate transparency levels may differ from 
market to market”2.  Thus, regulators’ aim is to establish the right degree of transparency that 
guarantees sufficient liquidity, informational efficiency and investor protection. In other 
words, what regulators should obtain are properly functioning financial markets. This goal has 
been accomplished in the European Union through the implementation of MiFID I and, then, 
MiFID II with MiFIR.  
 
This thesis focuses on the third dimension of market transparency, i.e. anonymity.  
                                                          
1
 The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report – The Financial Report of the National Commission on the Causes of the 
Financial and Economic Crisis in the United States –  Official Government Edition, January 2011. 
2
 “Trading Transparency in the UK secondary bond markets”, Financial Trading Authority, Discussion paper 
05/5, September 2005: pg.  23 
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More specifically, it aims at assessing how the introduction of post-trade anonymity in 
“Nuovo Mercato”, i.e. the equity market of Borsa Italiana for innovative and high growth 
companies, affected liquidity. Broker identities started to be concealed after-trade in 2004, 
following the implementation of a CCP system managed by Cassa di Compensazione e 
Garanzia. This study is innovative because, to my knowledge, no one in literature has 
investigated the effects of post-trade anonymity on the Italian Stock Exchange. Besides from 
the empirical analysis, the originality of my thesis stems also from the approach with which 
the review of the literature investigating market quality implications of transparency has been 
conducted. All research papers have been classified according to the peculiar dimension of 
transparency investigated, while generally a clear distinction is not drawn. 
 
The thesis is organized as follows.  
Chapter I outlines the concept of market transparency and captures the perception among 
securities regulators (CONSOB, SEC, IOSCO, SIB and Office of Fair Trading) about the 
importance to have lit financial markets. Then, transparency requirements for equity and non-
equity instruments imposed by the new regulation of EU investment services and securities 
markets (MIFIR and MIFID II) are analysed. The Chapter ends with an overview of the 
transparency literature investigating the impact of pre- and post-trade transparency on market 
quality and specifically on informational efficiency and liquidity.  
 
Chapter II is entirely dedicated to anonymity and starts with an excursus of the recent reforms 
undertaken by stock exchanges around the world in the dissemination of traders’ identity.  
The common trend has been toward the concealment of broker ID codes both before and after 
order execution and it has been driven by the widespread belief among regulators of enhanced 
market quality. Finally, the chapter investigates the informational value of broker ID codes 
and provides an overview of academics’ findings about market quality implications of pre- 
and post-trade anonymity. 
 
Chapter III deals with the empirical analysis which consists in replicating the study conducted 
by Friederich and Payne (2011). These academics analysed the equity trading platform SETS 
of the LSE around the implementation of a Central Counterparty system in 2001.  
More specifically, I attempted to reproduce their research in Nuovo Mercato, the Italian 
electronic order-driven equity market for high tech-firms and conventional businesses with 
product, process or logistics innovations. 
         8 
 
The period under observation includes fourteen months before and six months after January 
26 2004, on which date post-trade counterparty identification ceased. In fact, since then, 
Cassa di Compensazione e Garanzia has resulted as the counterparty of every trade.  
As the identity of brokers placing orders in the book was already concealed, trading became 
completely anonymous.  
The month of January 2004 was not included in the sample period because some tests took 
place to assess the new trading procedure. Over the observation period no change in the level 
of pre- and post-trade transparency occurred. 
As far as the construction of the main sample (hereafter “treated” sample) is concerned, my 
initial intentions were to include all 43 stocks listed on Nuovo Mercato during the observation 
period. However, only 11 shares were considered because the database Datastream provided 
either no data at all or insufficient information to run the regressions necessary to conduct my 
analysis. 
The sample companies represents about 67% of total market capitalization of Nuovo Mercato 
as at 31 December 2003, and 80% of total traded value over the year preceding the event. 
Furthermore, heterogeneity across stocks in terms of market capitalization, inside bid-ask 
spread and turnover by value is observed.  
Friederich and Payne (2011) focused on a particular aspect of market quality, i.e. liquidity, 
and investigate the impact of post-trade anonymity on inside bid-ask spreads, bid-ask spreads 
at the fifth limit price and depths available at those spreads. 
To evaluate the policy effect on these liquidity measures, these academics employed a 
difference-in-difference panel model which uses a control sample to eliminate confounding 
factors and to identify the average treatment effect on the treated stocks.  
I followed the same methodology for Nuovo Mercato, selecting the control stocks from Stoxx 
Europe 600 constituents. For comparability reasons, I picked only the constituents operating 
in the same industries as the firms included in the treated sample: technology and 
telecommunications sectors. Furthermore, I discarded those stocks traded at stock exchanges 
that saw the introduction of a CCP system over the sample period.  
For efficient causal inference purposes, I used the propensity score matching technique which 
allows to create a control group as comparable as possible (on the basis of observed baseline 
characteristics) to the treated group.  
The final comparison sample included 5 out of 12 candidate stocks. 
The limited availability of data forced me to restrict the analysis on just one liquidity measure: 
inside bid-ask spread. Nonetheless, some interesting observations could be done about the 
         9 
 
cross-sectional implications of post-trade anonymity on the width dimension of liquidity and 
the theoretical argument explaining these implications.  
Significant, even if partially, results are obtained.  
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Chapter I 
TRANSPARENCY AS KEY FEATURE OF MARKET DESIGN: 
IMPLICATIONS ON MARKET QUALITY. 
 
 
1.1 Preface  
Trade transparency is advocated by regulators of all over the world as one of the bricks of 
healthy financial markets. Indeed, it eases the price formation process, it induces investors to 
trust the market and to participate, and ensures best execution. Furthermore, a transparent 
environment favours the development of fair trading and enables market participants to take 
more aware investment decisions.  
Even if from a general point of view market transparency is always desirable, when we come 
to consider it as a market design feature no common consensus emerges among regulators and 
academics over its impact on market quality.  
Neither pre- nor post-trade transparency should be completely eliminated but appropriately 
calibrated for the type of financial instrument and the specific characteristics of the trading 
system (order-driven, quote driven, hybrid or voice broking system).  
Regulators’ aim is to establish the right degree of transparency that guarantees sufficient 
liquidity, informational efficiency and investor protection. In other words, what regulators 
should obtain are properly functioning financial markets. 
 
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.2 defines market transparency and illustrates 
its three dimensions (pre-trade transparency, post-trade transparency and anonymity).  
Section 1.3 focuses on the debate among securities regulators (CONSOB, SEC, IOSCO, SIB 
and Office of Fair Trading) about the importance to have “lit” securities markets. The next 
session is dedicated to the analysis of the new regulation of EU investment services and 
securities markets (MIFIR and MIFID II), which greatly innovates transparency regime. The 
chapter ends with an overview of trade transparency literature.  
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1.2 Market transparency: definition and dimensions  
The definition of market transparency, commonly used in many research papers, is the one 
provided by O’ Hara (1995): “the ability of market participants to observe information about 
the trading process”. Informally, it can be explained as the disclosure of information about 
the current opportunities to trade and recent trading history.  
The notion of transparency has to do with the informativeness of the order flow and the 
process of price discovery. The extent of trading data dissemination is contingent on the 
propensity of market participants to reveal and the exchange’s ability to publicly disclose buy 
and sell orders.  
Transparency is a three-dimensional pillar of market microstructure; it entails
3
: 
 Pre-trade transparency: display of order book information, i.e. current bid and 
ask quotations, market depths and other data such as limit orders away from the 
best prices, the existence of large order imbalances. This knowledge may be 
made available to all market participants or restricted to only a subset 
(brokers/dealers). 
 Post-trade transparency: public and timely dissemination of trade information, 
i.e., execution time, volume, price and direction of executed orders.  
 Anonymity: information about the identity of investors submitting orders either 
pre- or post-trade. 
Besides the type of information being revealed, also the extent of disclosure (brokers, 
customer, or public) and the speed of disclosure (real time or delayed) matter when analysing 
markets through the lens of transparency.
4
   
One way that is often advocated to estimate the size of transparency is the deviation from 
real-time disclosure standard. The meaning of “real time” is not unanimous: no later than 10 
seconds following execution in the United States
5
, within 3 minutes in all the EU exchanges 
(as a result of MiFID trade reporting requirements). The speed of disclosure usually varies 
according to trade size (the larger the trades, the longer the time frame between execution and 
publication), trade type (wholesale brokered trades are more likely to be subject to real time 
                                                          
3
 I mention the definition of transparency dimensions provided by Hachmeister and Schiereck in “Dancing in the 
dark: post-trade anonymity, liquidity and informed trading”, 2010, Review of Quantitative Finance and 
Accounting 34, pp.145–177.  Some authors like Madhavan (2000), Pham and Wersterholm (2013/2014) don’t 
consider  anonymity as a third dimension but the information about market participant’s identity pre- and post-
trade is included in pre- and post-trade transparency respectively.   
4
 Madhavan, A., (2000):  pp.205-258. 
5
 On February 12 2015 the Securities and Exchange Commission approved the proposal filed by the 
Consolidated Tape Association (“CTA”) Plan participants to bring forward the deadline by which they must 
report trades from 90 seconds to 10 seconds. The CTA is the body in charge of overseeing the real time 
dissemination of trade and quote information in NYSE LLC(Network A) and BATS, NYSE Arca, NYSE MKT 
and other regional exchange (Network B) listed securities.  
        Chapter I – TRANSPARENCY AS KEY FEATURE OF MARKET DESIGN: 
IMPLICATIONS ON MARKET QUALITY                                                                                                                                                       12 
 
dissemination than wholesale dealer mediated trades) and market architecture (auction or 
dealer market).  
 
1.3 The view of transparency among regulators 
The recent history of financial crises has thought about the importance of transparency in 
stabilizing financial markets and its welfare consequences. The lack of transparency has been 
pointed out by the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission as one of the factors that contributed 
to the exacerbation of the Great Recession. It, indeed, magnified the dangers of the heavy debt 
taken on by financial institutions, spreading the panic among investors
6
.  
Not only in the financial crisis literature, but also across regulatory authorities transparency is 
generally perceived as a desirable feature of market design. This view clearly emerges from 
the statutory aims and functions of regulators.  
The Commissione Nazionale per le Società e la Borsa (CONSOB), the public authority 
responsible for regulating the Italian financial markets, has as its core objective the protection 
of the investment public. This aim is pursued by performing, among others, the task of 
ensuring “transparency and correct behaviour by financial market participants”7. Similarly, 
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) “is concerned primarily with promoting 
the disclosure of important market-related information, maintaining fair dealing and 
protecting against fraud”8. The International Organization of Securities Commissions 
(IOSCO), the international body that aggregates world’s securities regulators, establishes that 
securities regulation should be aimed at guaranteeing market fairness, efficiency and 
transparency and it specifies in Principle 27 that “regulation should promote transparency of 
trading”.   
The IOSCO has in many occasions called for greater information dissemination to improve 
market quality: on the one hand pre-trade transparency facilitates the price formation process, 
it enhances market participants’ faith in the market and consequently liquidity; on the other 
hand post-trade transparency enables market users to verify whether they obtained 
better/worse prices with respect to other market users.  
In its “Market 2000 Report” the Division of Market Regulation of the SEC states that even if 
U.S. equity markets are characterized by the highest level of transparency in the world, they 
still need to improve market information disclosure for their effective operation. Trading data 
                                                          
6
 The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report – The Financial Report of the National Commission on the Causes of the 
Financial and Economic Crisis in the United States –  Official Government Edition, January 2011. 
7
 http://www.consob.it  
8
 http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml  
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should be disseminated in a more complete and less costly manner. The Division strongly 
believes that transparency advancements are pivotal in enhancing investors’ confidence “as 
professional attention is reconcentrated on finding the best market, providing information and 
judgment for the investor, and getting [the investor] the best net result”. In addition, in a 
context of proliferation of trading alternatives (regional stock exchanges
9
, third market 
dealers
10
, automated trading systems like PTS and internal systems operated by broker-dealers 
that cross their customers’ orders and other broker-dealers’ orders, trading in foreign stock 
exchanges through broker-dealers’ trading desks at the main securities markets around the 
world) to primary markets (NYSE, AMEX and NASAQ), widespread trade information has 
been advocated as a means to link the multiple market venues by allowing market participants 
to get a comprehensive understanding of supply and demand. In fact, one of the 
recommendations made by the Division is to encourage specialists and third market dealers in 
listed stocks to display limit orders that are priced better than the best quotes at Intermarket 
Trading System. In this way trading interests are fairly communicated to other markets.  
When discussing the introduction of the Investment Services Directive (Council Directive 
93/22/EEC of 10 May 1993), which was subsequently replaced by the Markets in Financial 
Instruments Directive (Directive 2004/39/EC, the so-called MiFID), the Securities and 
Investment Board (SIB), however, expressed a diametrically opposite view to the one 
previously highlighted. It called for a reduction of post-trade transparency by suggesting that 
too strict transparency requirements would have been detrimental to market efficiency and 
liquidity because market makers would have been forced to disclose their positions. This is 
especially true for block trades
11
. To understand SIB position we need to analyse the 
particular market microstructure that characterized London Stock Exchange in the early 90’s.  
At that time the London Stock Exchange market operated a competitive dealership in which 
prices and quantities of trades exceeding three times the Normal Market Size were published 
90 minutes later. Originally, from January 1989 to January 1991, there was a 24-hour delay in 
the dissemination of prices for trades over £100.000.
12
 The delay reduction is consistent with 
the Director of Fair Trading’s opinion that delayed trade publication rules prejudice 
competitiveness.  
                                                          
9
 In the US 5 regional stock exchanges are active: the Boston, Chicago, Cincinnati, Pacific and Philadelphia 
Stock Exchanges. They subtract a significant portion of orders, especially small customer orders, to NYSE and 
Amex (20%, and 16% respectively as reported in the first semester of 1993). They guarantee lower fees, speed of 
execution and primary market price protection.  
10
 The third market entails off-exchange execution of block trades and execution of transactions by market 
makers who are not members of an exchange. This trading alternative provides various incentives: fast, 
inexpensive service, cash discounts to firms with customer order flow.  
11
 SIB, “Regulation of the United Kingdom Equity Markets”, Discussion Paper, Feb. 1994, p. 11. 
12
 Gemmill (1996): p. 1765 
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Dealer markets are, indeed, generally denoted by lower levels of both pre- and post- trade 
transparency than auction markets. This is because stock exchanges authorities have 
accommodated the requests from market makers to refine publication rules by introducing 
long delays for block trades.  
On May 22, 2003, the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) submitted to the 
SEC the proposal to introduce post-trade anonymity feature to SuperMontage
13
. Until then, 
SuperMontage granted traders entering “Non-Attributable Quotes/Orders” pre-trade 
anonymity. This means that the identities of members submitting orders were not disclosed to 
market participants but only after a trade was executed. The proposed rule change called for 
the concealment of identification codes in the execution report sent to the parties to the trade 
and in the report created in Nasdaq’s Automated Confirmation Transaction Service. In 
particular, instead of the market participant identifier (MPID) the report will show a four-
letter identifier i.e. SIZE.  As a result, trading would have become completely anonymous.  
Although the SEC generally promotes transparency as one of the hallmarks of a healthy 
market, it approved the proposal. The reason of such decision relies on the Commission’s 
belief that the rule change may prevent front-running by other market participants who infer 
form members’ IDs the existence of one or more large institutional customers. In this way the 
probability for members to fill customers’ orders at worse prices would be greatly reduced. 
Yet, broker-dealers would enhance their ability to provide best execution to its clients. The 
Commission further stated that: “post-trade anonymity….enhance(s) the quality of the Nasdaq 
market and provide(s) market participants with the benefits of anonymity currently being 
offered by ECNs and PCXE”14,15. In other words, competition and innovation would benefit.  
While it is generally desirable to have the highest possible level of information dissemination 
in the name of greater fairness, efficient information acquisition, market consolidation and 
best execution, when we come to consider the appropriate level of transparency, however, the 
stuff becomes more complicated and controversial. 
This view was clearly stated by the Financial Services Authority (former Securities and 
Investment Board) in the evaluation of the adequacy of transparency arrangements in the UK 
secondary bond markets: “Transparency is not an end in itself. Total transparency is not 
                                                          
13
 SuperMontage is a highly innovative trading platform implemented by NASDAQ in 2002. Its main advantages 
are: increased speed and capacity, lower costs (narrower spread) and best execution for traders and investors. 
The director of the SEC Division of Market Regulation, Annette Nazareth, stated with respect to SuperMontage 
that it  “adds a limit order book that is electronically displayed and executed through automatic execution. The 
system was designed to enable Nasdaq to compete more effectively with ECNs and other market participants.” 
14
 ECNs and PCXE are two alternative order routing and execution services to SuperMontage.  
15
 Securities and Exchange Commission, Order Approving Proposed Rule Change by the National Association of 
Securities Dealers, Inc. Relating to a Post-Trade Anonymity Feature in SuperMontage, Federal Register, 
September 30, 2003, Vol. 68, No. 189, Notices: pg. 56366 
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necessarily optimal, and appropriate transparency levels may differ from market to market. 
We recognise also that there can be trade-offs between transparency and liquidity, and that in 
some cases access to liquidity pools may be at least as important as what is published and 
when. ” 16  
The IOSCO identifies five factors contributing to the determination of the transparency level 
in a market
17
: 
 The market microstructure. It can be defined as the area of finance that studies the 
way in which the exchange of assets takes place within a given regulatory framework.  
Traditionally, we distinguish between “order-driven markets” or “auction markets”, 
where trade occurs among public investors without dealer intermediation, and “quote-
driven markets” or “dealer markets” where the counterparty of every transaction is a 
market maker. Whether market microstructure should play a role in shaping the need 
for transparency is a decision of regulators. In particular, two trains of thinking among 
regulators are worth to be mentioned. On the one hand, market transparency rules 
should be designed in order to facilitate the participation of risk-bearing intermediaries 
who strengthen stock market efficiency. On the other hand, market microstructure is 
irrelevant. This view clearly emerges from the Securities Act Amendment of 1975, 
Section 11A, which didn’t point out an optimal market microstructure but strongly 
encouraged the creation of a national market system.   
 Asymmetric information as a reason for trading. Prompt dissemination of quotes, 
prices and volume is particularly desirable when some investors have an information 
advantage, which can be used to exploit other investors and broker-dealers. In fact, if 
all market participants have access to updated trade data, they will be able to detect the 
presence of insider traders.  
 Transaction volume. Block trades prefer less transparent trading mechanisms because 
they hinder the dissemination of order size information and so front-running by other 
market participants. As a result, cost of transacting is significantly reduced.  
 Wholesale market and retail market interaction. Two views should be 
distinguished. According to one approach, in order-driven markets if block traders 
trade off-exchange, opaqueness will make limit orders (retail traders) less willing to 
engage in block trading. As a result the limit order book depth will reduce.  
                                                          
16
 “Trading Transparency in the UK secondary bond markets”, Financial Trading Authority, Discussion paper 
05/5, September 2005: pg.  23 
17
 “Transparency on secondary markets” – A synthesis of the IOSCO debate, IOSCO Technical Committee 
Working party on the regulation of the secondary market, December 1992. 
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The way to deal with this problem is to create centralization, that is, to connect 
wholesale and retail markets. This can be achieved (among others) by broadcasting as 
soon as possible trade and price information both for retail and block trades.  
As regards quote-driven markets, there is no need to provide limit order protection
18
 
and so to blend the two submarkets. This is because only market orders are allowed. 
According to the second approach, instead, both dealer and auction markets would 
benefit from the immediate dissemination of greater and greater amount of quote 
information. It, indeed, enables to reach a good compromise in terms of fairness, 
volatility, immediacy, price discovery and to address both wholesale and retail 
investors’ requests.  
Which of the two views is right depends on the degree of information asymmetry in 
the wholesale market and on whether most of liquidity providers are retail traders. 
The underlying assumption is that wholesale and retail markets are not in competition. 
 The extent of inter-exchange competition.  
Some arguments against and in favour of regulation in the area of inter-exchange 
competition are worth to be mentioned. Those who support free competition claim that 
less transparent markets may be able to gain the benefits of the price discovery process 
in the more transparent regulated exchanges without sharing in the costs of that 
transparency. This, as it is sometimes argued, provides an unfair competitive 
advantage to the former markets and is potentially harmful to the overall price 
discovery process. By contrast, those who are pro-regulation state that competition 
reveals detrimental for price formation process and liquidity supply in the least opaque 
market. Furthermore, a minimum degree of regulation is called for to manage the 
wholesale-retail markets interaction. Today fragmented markets generate significant 
price inefficiencies that can be overcome by promoting full transparency.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
18
 Limit orders are unprotected when they remain unexecuted for a long period of time. This is because large 
transactions occur at prices that don’t match the current quotes.  
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1.4 Transparency as means to support price formation and investor protection in 
fragmented markets: MiFID requirements. 
1.4.1 The path towards the implementation of MiFID II and MiFIR. 
Investment services and securities markets were originally governed by the Council Directive 
93/22/EEC of 10 May 1993, namely the Investment Services Directive (hereinafter “ISD”). 
The directive was intended to uniform around Europe the authorization and other operating 
requirements for investment firms and banks so that, once authorized by the Member State of 
origin, they were free to create subsidiaries or offer services everywhere in the Union.  
In addition to the mutual recognition of authorization, this harmonization led to the 
application of the principle of home country supervision. 
In the years that followed financial markets have undergone significant changes: they have 
become more populous and there have been an ever-increasing proliferation of heterogeneous 
services. This new scenario has brought concerns in terms of investors’ rights preservation 
and has, therefore, called for further harmonization.  
To this end, the Directive 2004/39/EC (the so-called Markets in Financial Instruments 
Directive) was adopted in April 2004 and entered into force in November 2007 replacing the 
ISD.  
The MiFID aims at releasing competitive forces in the provision of trading venues and 
execution facilities by creating a common EU market for investment services and activities 
and at enhancing the protection of equity investors. 
On the one hand investors have benefited from tighter average bid-ask spread and lower 
transaction costs induced by stronger competition, on the other the consequent equity market 
decentralization and fragmentation have led to regulatory arbitrage.  
When the 2008 financial crisis hit the world economies, strong transparency and corporate 
governance deficiencies emerged, especially in the non-equities market. One of the 
commitments made by the leaders of G20 during 2009 London Summit was to enhance 
transparency of the financial sector so as to guarantee its stability.  
Furthermore, financial and technological advancements (the growth in high-frequency 
algorithmic trading) have exposed the need of extending the scope of  MiFID provisions also 
to financial instruments traded in unregulated pools (Over-The-Counter) in order to boost 
transparency and underpin investors’ trust. 
All these reform pressures have brought about the Directive 2014/65/EU of the 15 May 2014 
(MiFID II), which is a partial recast of the Directive 2004/39/EC, and the Regulation (EU) n° 
600/2014 (MiFIR). MiFID and MiFIR will come into force on 3 January 2017. 
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The MiFID review is aimed at widening the scope of the regulation into force and at reaching 
the maximum harmonization of the provisions among Member States. Consistently with this 
objective, many rules (in particular those concerning transparency requirements) included in 
the MiFID have been transposed in the MiFIR Regulation, which is directly applicable to all 
the Member States.  
Both legal frameworks innovating the MiFID apply to “investment firms, regulated markets, 
data reporting service providers and third country firms providing investment services or 
activities in the Union”19. 
 
1.4.2 From MiFID I to MiFID II: the major changes. 
The financial markets regulation has been heavily innovated.  
As far as transparency is concerned, waivers from the equity pre-trade transparency regime 
have been narrowed and a volume cap mechanism has been introduced in order to limit the 
use of such waivers. Furthermore, pre- and post-trade transparency regime, which was 
previously restricted to shares, has been broadened to equity-like (depositary receipts, ETFs, 
certificates and other similar financial instruments) and non-equity instruments (bonds, 
structure finance products, emission allowances and derivatives).   
In addition to regulated markets (RMs), multilateral trading facilities (MTFs)
20
 and systematic 
internalisers (SIs)
21
, a new regulated trading venue has been created: the organized trading 
facility (OTF). The OTF regime is defined by art. 4(1)(23) of the Directive 2014/65/EC as “a 
multilateral system which is not a regulated market or an MTF and in which multiple third-
party buying and selling interests are able to interact in a system in a way that results in a 
contract in accordance with Title II of the Directive”. 
The pre- and post-trade transparency requirements governing RMs and MTFs apply in the 
same way to this new trading platform but client orders are executed on a discretionary basis. 
Moreover, trading on OTFs is restricted to non-equity instruments only. 
This regulatory change is expected to reduce OTC trading so as to reach a level playing field.  
In order to ensure financial stability and orderly trading conditions, limits have been imposed 
on high-frequency algorithmic trading and on commodity derivatives.  
                                                          
19
 Directive 2014/65/EU: p. 2 
20
 Art. 4(1)(19) of Directive 2014/65/EC provides the definition of multilateral facility: “any system or facility in 
which multiple third-party buying and selling trading interests in financial instruments are able to interact in the 
system”. 
21
 Pursuant to art. 4(1)(20) of  Directive 2014/65/EC a systematic internaliser is “an investment firm which, on an 
organized, frequent systematic and substantial basis, deals on own account when executing client orders outside 
a regulated market, an MTF or an OTF without operating a multilateral system”. 
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On the one hand high-frequency algorithmic trading, like every technological innovation, 
brings many advantages: it mitigates volatility in the short-run, enables easier market access 
and participation, enhances liquidity, it tightens bid-ask spreads and improves the market 
conditions at which clients’ orders are executed. On the other, instead, it may create havoc in 
the market by overloading the system or by exacerbating the reaction to market events.  
Investment firms carrying out algorithmic trading must comply with several obligations. They 
are required to make sure to have resilient trading systems and adequate capacity to face 
severe market stress. The way to do this is by implementing systems and procedures limiting 
the proportion of unexecuted orders, slowing down order flow and imposing a minimum tick 
size. They have also notification duties of their trading activity to the competent authorities of 
the home Member State and to the trading venue of which they are participants. 
Furthermore, operators of a trading venue must implement a “circuit breaker” to temporarily 
stop or constrain trading in unusual conditions.  
Finally, they are required to keep track of the placed, cancelled, executed orders and quotes.  
To reduce market volatility generated by speculative attacks on commodities, the size of the 
net position held in commodity derivatives is not allowed to overcome a specific threshold or 
position limit.  
One last significant regulatory innovation is the requirement to trade derivatives, which are 
subject to clearing obligations and are sufficiently liquid, in RMs, MTFs or OTFs.  
 
1.4.3 Trade transparency requirements under MiFIR. 
1.4.3.a Pre- and post-trade transparency regime for trading venues: equity instruments. 
Before going into detail, the analysis of the topic at hand should start from the identification 
and definition of equity instruments falling within the scope of MiFIR.  
Three macro classes of securities are subject to transparency requirements: 
1. Transferable securities: financial instruments dealt in on the capital market excluding 
instruments of payment (art. 4(1)(44) of MiFID II). Within this category, we find: 
a. shares in companies, partnerships or other entities; 
b. exchange-traded funds which, for the purpose of MiFID II, shall have at 
least one unit negotiated over the day on at least one trading platform 
with at least one market maker ensuring that not significant price 
fluctuations from the unit’s net asset value occur.  
c. depositary receipts: financial instruments tradable on the capital market 
and giving a non-domiciled issuer the ownership right on certain  
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securities. In addition, they shall be admitted to trading on a regulated 
market and they must be traded independently of the securities of the 
non-domiciled issuer. 
d. certificates: securities tradable on the capital market giving 
underwriters, in the case of repayment by the issuer, priority over 
shares but not over unsecured bond instruments and equivalents; 
2. Money market instruments: securities usually traded on the money market including 
treasury bills, certificates of deposit and commercial papers. This category doesn’t 
encompass instruments of payment (art. 4(1)(17) of MiFID II);  
3. Units in collective Investment undertakings (Annex I Section C(3) of MiFID II). 
With respect to the latter two macro classes, no compulsory transparency system applies. 
 
Before trades take place, market operators and investment firms
22
 running one of eligible 
trading venues under MiFID II shall publish continuously, during normal trading session, 
current bid and offer prices and the depth of trading interests (or quantities) at those prices. 
This shall hold for shares, equity-like instruments and actionable indication of interests 
negotiated on a trading venue.  
The actionable indication of interests refers to the communication by one member of a trading 
venue to another of his or her buying/selling interest in a security.  
Transparency rules need to be adjusted not only for the type of financial instruments (equity 
or non-equity) but also to cope with the particular characteristics of the trading system: order-
book, quote-driven system, hybrid or voice broking system. This is because the heterogeneity 
within and across asset classes makes inappropriate a one-size fits all approach.  
While shares and equivalents are commonly traded in centralized auction markets, non-equity 
markets are typically decentralized dealer markets.  
Returning to the issue at hand, investments firms required to disclose their quotes shall be 
granted access indiscriminately and at reasonable commercial conditions to the information 
publication procedures put in place in the trading venue.  
However, the Competent authorities are allowed to exempt RMs, MTFs and OTFs from pre-
trade transparency requirements if one of the following conditions are met: 
i. Reference price system: in an eligible trading venue orders are matched according 
to a price, which is obtained from another market. This other market is the one 
where the financial instrument is allowed to be traded for the first time or the most 
                                                          
22
 Investment firms under art 4(1)(1) of Directive 2014/65/EU are legal persons who provide investment services 
and/or perform investment activities as their main business.   
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liquid market. The reference price shall be widely published and perceived as 
reliable by market participants; 
ii. Platforms formalizing negotiated transactions at prices different from current 
market conditions: transactions take place within the current volume weighted 
spread on the order book or the market-maker quotes or within a percentage of a 
suitable reference price where the financial instrument is illiquid
23
;  
iii. Orders that are larger than normal market size; 
iv. Orders held in an order management facility waiting for display (i.e. “iceberg 
orders”). 
The competent authority receiving a waiver application, before granting the exemption, must 
seek European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA)’s approval at least 4 months before 
the waiver is intended to take effect. ESMA shall issue its non-binding decision by 2 months. 
The use of the waivers is subject to supervision by the granting competent authority which 
can withdraw the waiver if its use doesn’t comply with the MiFIR requirements.  
One of the most important regulatory innovation from MiFID I is the introduction of a double 
volume cap mechanism restricting the use of reference price and the negotiated price 
waivers
24
. The rationale of this change is to minimize trading on dark pools and to prevent 
distortions in the price formation process.  
Under the volume cap mechanism, trading exempted from pre-trade transparency regime for 
one of the two reasons is not allowed to exceed 4% on a single trading venue and 8% on all 
EU trading venues of the total volume of trading in that financial instrument in the Union over 
the last year. The overcoming of the two limits triggers the suspension by the competent 
authority of the use of the waiver on that venue (in the case of the 4% cap) or across EU (in 
the case of the 8% cap) in that financial instrument for 6 months.  
The cap rule doesn’t apply to order-management facilities and large-in-scale transactions 
waivers. Large orders would execute at worse prices if they were displayed before the trade. 
Also negotiated transactions in equities, which are not traded on a continuous basis, within a 
percentage of a suitable benchmark price and negotiated transactions at terms far from the 
current market price don’t fall within the scope of the cap mechanism.  
                                                          
23
 Under MiFIR,  in the case of equity instruments, a liquid market is a market where the financial instrument is 
negotiated every day. Besides daily trading, other criteria must be mutually met in order for equities to be liquid: 
free float (not less than €500 m under MiFID I), average daily number of transaction (not less than 500 under 
MiFID I) and average daily turnover (not less than €2 m). ESMA in its Final Report of 19 December 2014 
expressed its intention to reduce the MiFID I thresholds in order to enable the achievement of the target of 
greater transparency. 
 
24
 Only negotiated transactions  at a price inside the volume weighted spread on the order-book or the quotes of 
market makers fall within the scope of the double volume cap mechanism.  
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On a post-trade basis, the operators of a trading venue are required to disclose, as quickly as 
possible, price, volume and time of executed transactions. Under MiFID I the real-time 
reporting obligation is complied with if transaction details are published within 3 minutes 
from the execution. ESMA, however, proposes in its Discussion Paper of 22 May 2014 about 
MiFID II and MiFIR to reduce this time limit to 1 minute because in this way the quality of 
post-trade information and the overall market transparency would be enhanced. 
The European Commission is empowered by article 7(2)(a) of MiFIR  to define the content of 
post-trade information subject to publication. ESMA, in turn, shall issue regulatory technical 
standards (RTS) implementing the new transparency requirements. Under the Implementing 
Regulation 1287/2006, article 27(1), the following transaction data are required to be 
disseminated: 
i. the trading day and time; 
ii. the instrument identifier; 
iii. the unit price and price notation; 
iv. the quantity, and 
v. the venue identifier (RM, MTF, SI or OTC). 
All these details enable the discovery of liquidity pools and, therefore, let investors to make 
more conscious decisions.  
The access to post-trade information shall be granted in a non-discriminatory way and at 
reasonable commercial conditions.  
Furthermore, competent authorities may grant waivers from the real-time reporting rule by 
admitting a publication delay on the basis of the type and size of the transaction. Specifically, 
orders that are larger than normal market size are subject to deferred display.  
The intention of the operators of a trading venue to make use of the exemption must be 
previously authorized by the competent authority and made public.  
 
1.4.3.b Pre- and post-trade transparency regime for trading venues: non-equity 
instruments 
With a view to enable sounder, more efficient, competitive and transparent EU financial 
markets, the scope of MiFID I has been extended to non-equity assets.  
In particular: 
1. Bonds, transferable securities tradable on the capital market including depositary 
receipts in respect of bonds (art. 4(1)(44)(b)) of MiFID II); 
2. Sovereign debt, debt instrument issued by: 
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a. The Union; 
b. The government, an agency or special purpose vehicle of a Member State; 
c. A member of the federation in the case of a federal Member State; 
d. A special vehicle purpose for a number of Member States; 
e. An international financial body created by a group of Member States with the 
aim to provide financial aids to the fellows facing severe financial problems; 
f. The European Investment Bank (art. 4(1)(60) and (61) of MiFID II). 
3. Structured finance products, a kind of transferable securities, arising from the 
securitization of a pool of financial assets, which gives underwriters the right to 
receive payments based on the cash flow generated by the underlying assets. Asset 
backed securities belong to this asset class (art. 2(1)(28) of MiFIR). 
4. Derivatives.  Under art. 2(1)(29) of MiFIR this category includes securitised 
derivatives (i.e. covered warrants certificated derivatives, negotiable rights and 
warrants attached to bonds and medium term notes tracking the performance of 
another assets) and derivative contracts (i.e. interest rate derivatives, foreign exchange 
derivatives, equity derivatives, commodity derivatives, credit derivatives and other 
derivatives). 
5. Emission allowances defined by Annex I, section C 11 of MiFID II as “ consisting of 
any units recognised for compliance with the requirements of Directive 2003/87/EC 
(Emissions Trading Scheme)”. 
 
In the pre-trade phase non-equity instruments are subject to the same requirements of equities 
in terms of information content to be made public, calibration of transparency rules based on 
the type of trading system and access to published information at a non-discriminatory and 
reasonable cost.  
The only difference concerns the exemptions from the pre-trade transparency regime.  
Waivers are granted by the competent authority for: large in size orders and orders kept in an 
order management facility on a trading venue waiting for display (like equity-instruments); 
actionable indications of interest in request-for-quote and voice trading systems above a 
specific size to the financial instrument; derivatives which are not subject to the trading 
obligation and illiquid
25
 financial instruments.   
                                                          
25
 For the purpose of MiFIR, in the case of non-equity instruments, a liquid market is a market for a financial 
instrument where there is continuous availability of buyers and sellers willing to trade. Four criteria are used in 
assessing whether non-equities are liquid: average size of transactions (total turnover over a period divided by # 
of trading days in that period), average frequency of transactions (minimum # of transactions over a specific 
period and minimum # of trading days on which at least 1 transaction occurred over a specific period), data 
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Furthermore, when an exemption is recognized to actionable indication of interests, operators 
of trading venue are required to disclose, continuously during the trading day, indicative pre-
trade bid and offer prices.  
Even for non-equity assets, Member State regulators have notification duty to ESMA and are 
empowered to withdraw the waiver under the same circumstances established for equity 
instruments. They may also provide for a temporarily suspension of the pre-trade transparency 
obligations, should liquidity fall under an established threshold.  
As far as post-trade transparency is concerned, some (although subtle) distinctions from the 
regime designed for shares and equivalents can be outlined. In particular, on ESMA’s 
proposal, an additional information should be disclosed: the quantity notation (nominal value 
or number of units). Furthermore, “escapes” from the real-time reporting requirement may be 
provided not only for large in scale trades but also for illiquid financial instruments, above 
specific size transactions posing excessive risk to liquidity suppliers and for types of 
transactions. The competent regulators have the authority to suspend for a maximum of 3 
months post-trade transparency obligations with respect to non-equities whose liquidity is 
become lower than a defined level. ESMA is mandated to clarify the methods for the 
calculation of the instrument-specific liquidity threshold.  
Once authorized, the publication delay doesn’t necessarily imply the omission of all details of 
the transactions during the deferred period. Indeed, the national competent authorities may 
call for the disclosure of limited pieces of information of many transactions on an aggregated 
basis and/or require the concealment of the volume of an individual transaction for an 
extended period of deferral. 
At the end of the deferral period all information must be disseminated, unless the financial 
instruments are sovereign bonds. In the latter case, in fact, the publication of several 
transactions in an aggregate form for an indefinite time period may be granted.  
 
1.4.3.c Pre- and post-trade transparency regime for systematic internalisers and 
investment firms trading OTC: equity instruments. 
Under article 4(1)(20) of MiFID II systematic internalisers are investment firms executing 
client orders on own account away from regulated markets, MTF or OTF and the conduct of 
this activity is organized, frequent and systematic, and substantial.  
The “frequent and systematic” criterion must be assessed looking at number of OTC 
transactions in the financial instrument executed by the investment firm when dealing on own 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
related to market participants (number and type) and average size of transactions (end-of-day relative bid-ask 
spreads as published by the most relevant market in terms of liquidity).   
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account. In order for the investment firm to qualify as SIs in respect of equities, this figure 
shall be, over the last 6 months, at least 0,4%
26
 of the total amount of transactions carried out 
in the Union on any trading venue or OTC in the same spell. 
The “substantial” requirement, instead, must be assessed taking into account the size of OTC 
transactions executed by the investment firm with respect to the total trading of the 
investment firm in a specific financial instrument or the total trading in the EU in a specific 
financial instrument. ESMA clarified that these two ratios shall be, over the last 6 months, at 
least 15% and 0,4%  respectively for the SIs regime in respect of equities to apply.  
Investment firms that don’t meet these thresholds may anyway be subject to SIs transparency 
requirements if they voluntary opt to. On ESMA’s proposal, investment firms should verify 
their compliance with the criteria every 4 months.  
The SIs regime has been introduced in order to shift dark trading to lit platforms as much as 
possible. With this aim in mind, MiFIR provides for precise transparency obligations ensuring 
efficient price discovery and fair trading among venues. 
Systematic internalisers are required to disclose firm quotes regularly and continuously during 
the normal trading day. Every quote, for each financial instrument, must be two-sided: it shall 
consist of both a bid price and an ask price.  
This requirement applies to liquid equity instruments traded on a trading venue, provided that 
the size of transactions is not larger than the standard market size. If a liquid market doesn’t 
exist, SIs must publish quotes only upon customer’s solicitation.  
Quote revision and (only exceptionally) withdrawal are permitted.  
Furthermore, access to quotes shall be granted at a reasonable cost and SIs can use their 
discretion in choosing to which clients they want to provide pre-trade information. 
On a post trade basis, volume, price of the transaction and time of execution shall be made 
public by means of an approved publication arrangement (“APA”)27. Unlike pre-trade 
transparency obligations, post trade reporting rules don’t discriminate between liquid and 
illiquid instruments. 
Deferred publication may be authorised under the same circumstances established for 
regulated markets, MTF and OTF.  
 
 
                                                          
26
 For illiquid equity instruments  the frequent and systematic criterion is satisfied, if the activity is carried out in 
the same financial instrument daily over the last semester.  
27
 APA is defined as by art. 4(1)(52) of MiFID II as “a person authorized under this Directive to provide the 
service of publishing trade reports on behalf of investment firms”. 
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1.4.3.d Pre- and post-trade transparency regime for systematic internalisers and 
investment firms trading OTC: non-equity instruments. 
The thresholds, used to assess whether an investment firm is eligible for SIs regime, varies for 
each class of non-equities and for the instrument-specific liquidity characteristics. 
Post-trade transparency requirements are homogenous to the ones established for shares and 
equity like instruments. The pre-trade transparency regime, instead, differs just for two facts: 
1. For liquid instruments, the publication of firm quotes is mandatory only if a quote is 
called for by the client of the systematic internaliser and if the SI is willing to provide 
such a quote. 
2. For illiquid instruments, if systematic internalisers wish to provide a quote, they shall 
disseminate firm quotes upon customer’s solicitation. 
 
1.5 The literature review 
In this section I am going to illustrate academics’ findings about how the first two dimensions 
of transparency can affect the health of the market.  
I decided to conduct a separate analysis for pre- and post-trade transparency because full 
transparency is not necessarily good and each dimension has peculiar effects.  
1.5.1 The literature on pre-trade transparency and its impact on market quality 
Academics envision very different effects of changes in the amount of pre-trade transparency 
on market soundness. The absence of a common agreement arises, probably, from the 
heterogeneity of the investigated trading venues (in terms of market structure, trading 
mechanism, market capitalisation), of market quality measures and the econometric technique 
employed.  
Boehmer et al. (2005) study the NYSE around the implementation of the OpenBook service 
in January 2002. Before analysing the regulatory change, some information about the 
institutional features needs to be provided.  
The NYSE is the world’s largest stock exchange by market capitalisation. It is an hybrid 
market characterized by the co-existence of an automated order driven market (SuperDot) and 
a floor based quote driven market (NYSE floor).   
On the floor, trading of each stock takes place in a designated trading post where a specialist 
acts as a trade facilitator. Investors represented by floor brokers form a crowd around the 
trading post to find the best bid or ask price. The bid and ask offers are called out loud in 
order to induce interested counterparties to participate. Besides through floor brokers, the 
specialist can receive investors’ orders electronically via SuperDot system.  
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The specialist doesn’t only bring buyers and sellers together but also softens order imbalances 
by acting as a dealer. 
The introduction of the OpenBook service has made visible to traders off the NYSE floor the 
content of the specialist’s limit order book. In particular, they are provided with instantaneous 
information about the depth available at each price level for all securities. Prior to the event, 
only the specialist knew about its limit order book and only the best bid and best offer were 
available to the public. 
The enhanced pre-trade transparency poses on limit orders the risk of being front-run and of 
information leakages. In order to protect themselves against these risks, limit order traders 
change profoundly their tactics.  
Boehmer et al. find empirical evidence of all but one predictions made by Harris (1996) about 
order exposure management. Higher cancellation rate of limit orders (# cancelled limit 
orders/#submitted orders), shorter time to cancellation (seconds between submission and 
cancellation) and a reduction in the size are observed in the post-event period (from February 
to May 2002). However, the authors don’t discover an increase in the activity of floor brokers. 
Actually more order flow is routed electronically to limit order book. Such a result is in line 
with the view that the OpenBook makes visible to investors the impact of their trading and it 
therefore enables them to pursue strategies without the involvement of a floor broker. 
Investors are now more able to decide on their own whether to take or provide liquidity on the 
basis of the book conditions. 
Also the specialist’s behaviour changes in respond to the new regulatory scenario.  
The publication of the content of the limit order book reveals to the market the confidential 
information that the specialist has access to by virtue of its position. As a consequence 
proprietary trading may be no longer a profitable strategy. This is one of the reasons why the 
depth that is added to the book reduces.  
Another explanation of such a finding can be identified in the increased use of the SuperDot 
order-routing system by traders, since specialists are obliged to leave the ground to public 
investors at the same price or better when acting as dealers.  
Market participants’ new action plan leads to a more efficient and liquid market. Indeed, 
lower fluctuations of the transaction price from the efficient price and a random walk process 
of returns are observed following the study event.  
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After controlling for volatility, volume and price, the effective spread
28
 of market and 
marketable orders tightens indicating a smaller price impact. Boehmer et al., therefore, define 
the increase in pre-trade transparency as a “win-win situation”.  
Madhavan et al. (2005) reach diametrically opposite conclusions when analysing the 
transparency rule change which took place in Toronto Stock Exchange in April 1990.  
This institutional innovation consisted of the introduction of Market By Price computerized 
system that made accessible to the public real-time information about depth at the five best 
bid and ask prices.  
Such pre-trade transparency expansion involved both the automated trading system CATS 
and TSE’s floor. However, the effects were stronger for the stocks traded in the floor because 
it was characterized by a lower level of transparency than CATS (the limit order book, in fact, 
was accessible only to the Registered Trader). 
More specifically, wider quoted and effective spread (even after the inclusion of volume, 
price and volatility controls), reflecting a remarkable increase in the adverse selection 
component, are documented. Furthermore, the return volatility increases after the natural 
experiment and its magnitude is greater the further we are from April 1990.  
As many theoretical models predict, stock prices do fall as a result of higher execution costs.  
No statistically significant impact is found with regard to the quoted depth in CATS stocks
29
, 
since before the event it already disseminated the depth at each price level to its members. 
However, according to Madhavan (1996), the observed rise in volatility may be induced by a 
reduction in bid and ask sizes. Opening the book, in fact, makes more attractive market orders 
than limit orders because of the increase in monitoring costs. 
In addition, specialists see its profit to dry up as they can no longer keep their informational 
advantage. Finally, Madhavan et al. conclude their survey by identifying other two drawbacks 
of transparent markets. On the one hand, gaming and market manipulation occur more 
frequently. On the other, large institutional investors migrate toward opaque trading venues 
(upstairs, off-exchange, after-hours, foreign exchanges) thereby worsening liquidity in lit 
markets.  
The theoretical model developed by Angeles de Frutos et al. (2013) may be useful to 
reconcile the different results reported in the two empirical researches so far analysed. 
Angeles de Frutos et al. find that in large markets greater transparency in the form of public 
                                                          
28
 The effective spread is computed as double the difference between transaction price and the mid-quote.  
29
 The effects of MBP introduction on quoted depth in floor traded stocks are biased in the sense that a potential 
increase may be due to the exposure of previously hidden liquidity. This is because, before the rule change, the 
Regulated Traders (specialists) could decide to display only an indicative depth.  
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dissemination of the noise component of the order flow is panacea. It, indeed, enhances 
liquidity and mitigates price volatility. By contrast, in markets where less active securities are 
traded the effects are ambiguous and are contingent on the value of the parameters. 
Accordingly, market capitalization makes the difference. The Toronto Stock exchange and 
NYSE present similar market structure as both mix order-driven and quote-driven features, 
but the former is by far thinner than the latter.  
Eom et al. (2007)’s empirical analysis of the Korea Stock Exchange, an order-driven market, 
shows the existence of a positive and concave relationship between pre-trade transparency 
and market quality: beyond a certain threshold an increase in the former induces an 
improvement in the latter but less and less
30
.    
Their findings are more robust than previous researches for two reasons.  
First, they are based on a broader range of quality measures. Indeed, in addition to the 
traditional proxies (bid-ask spread, relative bid ask spread, market depth and transient 
volatility), market to limit order ratio, full-information trade cost (FITC)
31
 and the MRR 
implied spread in its two components (adverse selection cost and transitory cost) are 
considered. 
Second, Eom et al. conduct a panel-data analysis which allows to control for variables 
directly influencing market quality like volume and price. The authors state that the empirical 
models employed by many academics are not reliable because either they don’t include such 
controls or they use unsuitable techniques in doing it.   
The implicit assumption underlying the studies examined so far is that the actual sizes and the 
exposed sizes in the limit order-book are the same. What if an exchange allows to submit 
“Iceberg” or “reserve” orders? What would be the consequences in terms of liquidity and 
informational efficiency? 
Gozluklu (2014) provides an answer to these questions. In particular, the author observes that 
opacity in the form of hidden orders affects market quality differently according to the 
information set traders hold.  
Two scenarios are envisioned: all traders equally informed; one monopolistic insider (or an 
auction for private information). 
                                                          
30
 Eom et al. exploit two natural experiments occurred in KRX. The first took place in 2000 and involved the 
dissemination of the 5 best prices instead of 3. The second, in 2002, extended further the amount of pre-trade 
information granted to the public by making visible 5 additional price levels.  
31
 FITC can be defined as the price incorporating all the public and private information available at a specific 
moment. The informational efficiency of prices is captured by gap between the actual trading price and FITC. 
This gap is called trade execution cost.  
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Under symmetric information, the opaque regime tightens bid-ask spreads and mitigates the 
price impact of market orders. In other words, the book becomes more resilient
32
 boosting 
market liquidity.   
This is because under opacity conditions, liquidity traders (in particular the large ones
33
)  
employ a different order exposure strategy. Limit orders are partially replaced with reserve 
orders and submitting fewer market orders pursues lower trading aggressiveness.  
The possibility to partially hide order size allows to moderate the race among liquidity 
suppliers, to prevent scalping following a public information release and to hedge against 
price risk. Yet, in the absence of adverse selection, liquidity traders, and especially the large 
ones, earn higher trading profits in opaque markets to the detriment of noise traders.  
Under the presence of a monopolist insider, instead, reduced transparency doesn’t lead to a 
significant reduction of the bid-ask spread and therefore to more ample liquidity. This is 
because the impact of adverse selection costs outweighs the effect of exposure costs, except in 
the trading cycle during which a public information shock takes place. 
The monopolist insider joins large liquidity traders in demanding and supplying liquidity.  
It submits both hidden orders and less aggressively priced limit orders in order to prolong the 
exploitation of its informational advantage.   
However, when the insider has to share the informational rents with another one, opacity does 
improve market quality through larger book depth. Furthermore, informational efficiency is 
enhanced by a faster value discovery process. 
In opaque regime informed traders’ welfare is increased at the expense of large liquidity 
traders.  
Another important contribution to pre-trade transparency literature is provided by 
Bessembinder et al. (2009). Their study starts from the observation of undisclosed orders 
usage in Euronext and finds that 18% of incoming orders partially hide their size and 44% of 
order volume is concealed.  
They also discover that hidden liquidity option is mainly used for less liquid firms and large 
trades. The picture that emerges shows that many traders benefit from a reduction in 
transparency. This means that if the Euronext didn’t grant the possibility to expose only a 
portion of the actual order quantity, many market participants would move to alternative 
trading systems leading to market fragmentation. The consequences would be devastating 
both in terms of market quality and informational efficiency.  
                                                          
32
 Market resiliency is one of the dimensions of liquidity and it can be defined as the speed with which prices 
come back to their previous levels after large order-flow imbalances triggered by uninformed trading. 
33
 Large liquidity traders have a higher private valuation of the asset. 
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1.5.2 The literature on post-trade transparency and its impact on market quality: LSE 
case. 
Many empirical studies on post-trade transparency focus on the examination of the delayed 
trade publication regime, which characterized the London Stock Exchange in the period 1986-
1996. The beginning of that decade passed into the annals of the British financial history for 
the so-called “Big Bang” reform.  
The “Big Bang” involved a radical deregulatory intervention and was aimed at giving the City 
of London the world primacy not only across many financial markets like the foreign 
exchange market but also in the securities business.  
Some of the measures undertaken included the abolishment of fixed minimum commissions, 
the elimination of the single capacity rule preventing member firms from being brokers-
dealers or dual traders, the possibility of outside ownership of member firms and the 
introduction of screen-trading. Such a bundle of reforms significantly increased the ability of 
the London quote-driven market to compete internationally.  
Until 27 September 1989, prices and quantities of both block and small trades were revealed 
to the public immediately i.e. within 5 minutes. This post-trade transparency regime 
concerned market makers who claimed that instantaneous publication of large trades would 
have been detrimental to market liquidity.  
The London Stock Exchange is known for its ability to provide immediacy to institutional 
traders and this requires dealers to keep a high level of inventory. The huge inventory risk 
forces market-makers to offer customers worse prices when trading with them. The result is 
fewer block trades.  
Dealer’s complaints led to restrictions of transparency for large trades:  
 in 1989 a 24 hour deferral in the dissemination of prices of trades exceeding £100.000 
was introduced;  
 in 1991 the delay was reduced to 90 minutes and it related trades whose size was more 
than triple Normal Market Size (both trade price and trade volume were subject to 
deferral); 
 in 1993 the details of trades above 75 times NMS34 were allowed to remain concealed 
for 5 business days. No rule change was introduced for trades above 3 times NMS 
which continued to be undisclosed for 90 minutes; 
                                                          
34
 Normal Market Size is the criterion used to classify stocks according to liquidity. This categorization is 
performed by taking into account the average transaction size of each stock. Before the introduction of NMS 
concept, securities used to be grouped into four classes: alpha (the most liquid shares), beta, gamma and delta. 
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 finally, in 1996 post-trade transparency was slightly enhanced via a curtailment of the 
deferral to 60 minutes for trades whose size exceeded 75 times NMS. This delay 
applied also to trades larger than 6 times (instead of 3 times) NMS, provided that they 
didn’t take place among market-makers. The London Stock exchange set two 
objectives: at least 75% of the value of trading should have been disclosed with no 
delay and minimum 95% no later than 60 minutes. The reason why the exchange 
stepped back was the belief of Office of Fair Trading that the delayed publication 
regime would have damaged competition giving large market makers an unjust 
informational advantage. 
Gemmill (1996)
35
 finds that market makers’ concern of a reduction in liquidity as a result of 
instantaneous publication is unjustified.  
Delayed publication exerts no significant effect on the width of spreads on large trades 
compared to small trades. If a tightening/widening of spreads is observed, this is only 
attributable to volatility. Thus, no liquidity improvement is obtained.  
Yet, the reduced post-trade transparency doesn’t mitigate price movements after a block 
transaction nor it causes longer price adjustments. By contrast, the author finds evidence of a 
permanent price impact providing support to the hypothesis that large trades incorporate 
information. Nevertheless, during the deferral period market makers are not able to take 
advantage of the information they have access to by participating in block trades. In fact, the 
prices of two trades before a large purchase increase significantly indicating an outflow of 
information. No information leakage is, instead, observed before a large sale.  
Thus, the argument that market makers use to oppose the immediate publication is unfounded.  
According to Gemmill, the actual reason why market makers call for delayed publication of 
block trades is to impede the creation of an upstairs market which would threaten their 
position.  
Board  et al. (1996) discover that the temporary concealment of large trades details is not (or 
only in part) exploited by market-makers to protect themselves against inventory risk.  
In particular, they observe that dealers take 45 out of 90 minutes
36
 to get rid of the surplus 
inventory by trading with customers or other market-makers
37
. Within that time frame just 
less than half of volume of block trades is unwound. This provides evidence of the fact that 
what market-makers look after is not the trade size of the single transaction but the cumulative 
                                                          
35
 Gemmill(1996) uses as sample period the time span from 1987 to 1992.  
36
 Board et al. (1996) conduct their empirical analysis for the period 1 April 1992 – 31 March 1994. 
37
 Trades between market makers can take place either through Stock Exchange Automated Quotation (SEAQ) 
system or Inter-Dealer Broker system. 
While latter system is characterized by anonymity of trading, the former is not.  
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amount of inventory. The latter finding is further confirmed by the absence of a relationship 
between size and traded bid-ask spreads.  
The absence of  such a nexus may indicate that the main reason for which delayed publication 
of large trades was introduced reveals unrealistic. Alternatively, it may signal that deferred 
disclosure is actually useful because it allows market-makers to avoid quoting wider spreads 
to offset the greater inventory risk .  
The authors find that deferred disclosure leads to informational inefficiency because the 
permanent price impact of block trades takes long to establish.  
Board et al. conclude their study by acknowledging that the reduction in transparency may 
not trigger any benefit to market makers undertaking large trades.  
Another proof of the lack of a trade-off between post-trade transparency and market quality is 
provided by Board et al. (2000) who analyse the transparency enhancement, which took place 
in LSE in 1996.  
As mentioned earlier, the length of delay was shortened by 30 minutes (from 90 to 60 
minutes), and the size above which trades were considered large was raised from 3 to 6 times 
NMS. This rule change permitted to reduce the amount of trading subject to temporary 
concealment by 43% and to overcome the threshold of 75% of the value of trading 
immediately disclosed for block trades.  
To verify the success of the new post-trade transparency regime in improving market quality, 
the authors focus their attention on trades whose size is in between 3 and 6 x NMS. The year 
1996 proved to be a turning point for such trades: they switched from the 90 minute delay rule 
to the immediate publication rule.   
Contrary to what market-makers sustain, volume of the concerned trades didn’t fall and the 
bid-ask spread even tightened. Thus, no losses in liquidity arose from the fast release of  
details about intermediate sized trades. I 
In addition, market-makers behaviour didn’t change: neither pre- nor post-positioning38  
showed significantly different patterns. Also the volume of inter market-maker trading 
remained almost the same. 
In sum, the empirical literature gives evidence of what London Stock exchange stated in 
1987: “the faster is information disseminated to the market at large, the better”. 
                                                          
38
 By pre- and post-positioning we mean how  market-makers manage their inventory, respectively before and 
after a large trade is accommodated. More specifically, they measure by how much and how long it takes to 
change the level of inventory prior to or following a block transaction.   
         34 
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Chapter II 
A FOCUS ON ANONIMITY:  
IS THE DISCLOSURE OF BROKER ID CODES GOOD FOR THE 
MARKET? 
 
 
2.1 Preface 
The increasingly automation of floor-traded equity markets has led to the progressive removal 
of broker identification codes. This trend was followed almost worldwide with the notable 
exception of Korean Exchange.  
The driving force behind this revolution was the common belief among regulators of 
enhanced market quality. This issue has been long debated by academics, which reach mixed 
conclusions about the potential implications of broker identifiers concealment.  
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 makes an excursus of the recent reforms 
undertaken by stock exchanges around the world in the dissemination of traders’ identity.  
Section 2.3 illustrates the strand of the literature investing the informational value of broker 
identities. Section 2.4 provides a complete overview of academics’ findings about market 
quality implications classifying research papers according to the type of information 
investigated. Finally, section 2.5 draws some conclusions.  
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2.2 Anonymity: a world tendency 
At the turn of the 21
st
 century trading rules in equity markets around the world 
underwent changes. The field of regulatory intervention covered one of the dimensions of 
transparency: anonymity.   
The majority of European stock exchanges have opted for the concealment of broker identities 
both before and after the execution of the transaction. The pioneer of the trend toward 
anonymity was London Stock Exchange, which introduced the choice of a central 
counterparty (CCP) for electronic equity trading (SETS and SETSqx markets) in February 
2001. Since CCP acts as a buyer for every seller and as a seller for every buyer, after trade 
counterparties’ identity has become no more visible. Given the already existing pre-trade 
anonymity, trading has turned out to be entirely anonymous. Nevertheless, at that time SETS 
was an electronic order-driven system that guaranteed one of the higher (if not the highest) 
level of both pre- and post-trade transparency of the limit order book among the main stock 
markets.   
The example of LSE was followed by Euronext Paris in April 2001. In occasion of the merge 
with Amsterdam Stock Exchange and Brussels Stock Exchange, Paris Bourse started not to 
disseminate ID codes of broker-dealers entering limit orders to the book. Not only pre- but 
also post-trade anonymity was introduced: counterparty identity remained unknown even after 
the execution of the transaction.
39
 
This rule change was implemented by the French stock exchange in order to conform its 
trading protocols to the ones of the other two equity markets forming Euronext.   
In 2003 Deutsche Börse AG, like the LSE, launched in a two-step approach a CCP for 
equities traded on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange.  
The FSE is the most liquid
40
 of Germany’s seven stock exchanges and one of largest trading 
venue in the world. It is a hybrid market, which combines the fully electronic trading system 
XETRA with Frankfurter Wertpapierbörse floor
41
. As XETRA trading has always been pre-
trade anonymous (i.e. market participants submitting orders are unknown), following the 
introduction of a CCP, anonymity applies also to the clearing and settlement processes. 
Despite the complete concealment of counterparty identity, XETRA provides both pre- and 
                                                          
39
Actually, before April 2001 post-trade anonymity was applied to transactions in CAC40 stocks, which are the 
most liquid and largest shares listed on Euronext Paris. 
40
 As reported by Deutsche Börse’s official website, the share in turnover in Frankfurt Stock Exchange is larger 
than 85%. 
41
In 2011 floor trading switched to Xetra technology (Xetra Frankfurt Specialist Trading). Nowadays, in fact, 
specialists, who offer quotes and oversee executed trades, assist floor trading. Xetra platform performs a mere 
price determination function. This change was implemented with the attempt to increase the speed of trading, to 
make FSE’s scope international and to enhance liquidity provision. 
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post-trade transparency: market participants can observe the entire order-book and prices and 
volume of executed transactions are disseminated in real-time.  
Exemptions to the general trend are Northern European countries. In fact, in April 2009 
Nasdaq OMX Nordic
42
 removed post-trade anonymity introduced in the previous year for the 
five most traded shares on Stockholm market and restricted it to the five largest shares listed 
in Helsinki. Copenhagen exchange has continued to disclose member identity, whereas 
Reykjavik (Iceland) market has not.  
While harmonizing EU Member States in terms of pre- and post-trade transparency, MiFID I 
directive doesn’t enumerate broker identity among the pieces of information to be made 
available to the public.  
As far as Asian markets are concerned, the least anonymous trading takes place on the Korean 
Exchange. Since 25 October 1999, the identities of the five largest buyer and seller brokers 
for each stock have been disclosed instantaneously not only in the Korean Stock Exchange 
and the Korea future exchange but also in KOSDAQ stock market. By contrast, Tokyo (from 
June 2003), Singapore, Taiwan markets provide fully unidentified order book.  
Also American exchanges are aligned in offering complete anonymity to traders. Two 
interesting cases are worth mentioning: Toronto Stock Exchange and Nasdaq. These markets 
stand out from the rest because they leave the implementation of full anonymity to trading 
participant’s discretion. In fact, traders, when submitting an order, can either designate 
attribution i.e. the market participant’s identifier will be made visible in all market data feeds 
or require a generic code (“001” in the case of TSX and “SIZE” in the case of Nasdaq) to be 
attached to the order for its entire life cycle, even after fulfillment
43
.   
Anyway, in the case of unattributed orders, trader identity will be disclosed to the entity 
entitled to facilitate settlement of accounts (National Securities Clearing Corporation or the 
Canadian Depository for Securities Limited) at the end of each trading day.  
Finally, in 2005 and 2007 the Australian and New Zealand Stock Exchanges were among the 
last equity markets to switch to anonymous regime.  
Before 2005, in the ASX each broker could observe the identifier of brokers submitting orders 
to the central limit order book. Access to such information was, instead, denied to any other 
market participant. Nevertheless, this ban on broker ID dissemination was systematically 
circumvented by large institutional investors who obtained insights from their brokers.  
                                                          
42
Nasdaq OMX Nordic operates four Nordic stock exchanges: Nasdaq Copenhagen, Nasdaq Helsinki, Nasdaq 
Stockholm and Nasdaq Iceland. 
43
The Toronto Stock Exchange offers traders another possibility to disguise their identity: the submission of 
“jitney orders“. By means of “jitney orders”, a broker executes order flow routed by another. The name of the 
originating broker is concealed to the market.  
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They, therefore, enjoyed information privileges compared to individual investors. Following 
the rule change, broker identities have been kept secret (the standard code “777-7” is 
attached) for 3 days after trade execution. The ASX market reform, however, undermined the 
attractiveness of New Zealand Stock Exchange: many cross-listed stocks on NZX started to 
be traded in the anonymous Australian platform.  
This was one of the reasons that forced NZX to align with the global trend. 
The anonymity revolution has been mainly driven by the necessity of traditional stock 
exchanges to fight the battle for market share against Alternative Trading Systems. For 
instance, in the years preceding 
the introduction of SuperMontage 
post-trade anonymity feature, 
Nasdaq had been losing ground to 
Electronic Communication 
Networks (see figure 2.1). An 
ECN is an electronic trading 
platform that facilitates trading 
among its subscribers: retail 
investors, institutional investors, 
market makers and other broker-
dealers. In other words, it is an open limit order book where buyers and sellers can display 
their trading interest bypassing established exchanges. The first alternative trading system to 
be developed was Instinet in 1969. Instinet was created to enable institutional investors to 
have their trades executed. In the years that followed, several new ECNs proliferated (like 
Brut, Archipelago and Island) until the beginning of the millennium when as many as twelve 
ECNs were operative. At that time, off-exchange systems were drying up a significant portion 
of Nasdaq volume and their competitive advantage relied on four factors:  
 Full anonymity: subscribers entering an order will never know with whom they traded. 
Indeed, in the execution report the ECN results to be the counterparty of the trade. By 
contrast, until 2003, SuperMontage granted only pre-trade anonymity. 
 Small transaction costs, since ECNs rely on computer software to bring buyers and 
sellers together. 
 Order display options: ECN subscribers can choose among a wide range of tools to 
communicate their trading interest, including pegged and discretionary orders. The 
former are orders whose price will track a benchmark price: the NBBO. The latter, 
Figure 2.1. Source: BusinessWeek - August 11, 2003 
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instead, are orders whose price is made up of two elements: a displayed price and a 
hidden discretionary price. The discretionary price consists of undisclosed upward 
adjustment in the case of buy orders and downward adjustment in the case of sell 
orders. The order will execute if on the other side an order priced inside the 
discretionary range is entered.  
 Rebates: ECN grants rebates to liquidity providers in order to attract trading volume.  
Therefore, with the attempt to increase the attractiveness of SuperMontage, Nasdaq has 
started to offer ECN-like services and in December 2005 it acquired Instinet. 
Assessing whether the decision to restrict transparency by means of broker IDs concealment 
has proved panacea for the quality of the concerned equity markets is the objective of many 
research papers. 
The analysis of the results obtained by the most important academic studies on anonymity 
will be the subject of the next paragraphs. 
 
2.3 Broker identities: a conveyor of information to market participants 
As previously mentioned, many exchange officials around the world have chosen to 
prevent the market from recognizing trading patterns linked with specific broker mnemonics.   
Two questions arise: does this impediment imply that broker identity has no informational 
value and therefore it is not worth displaying? Or if it really conveys information, does ID 
code revelation damage a particular class of investors? 
One important strand of literature states that broker identifiers do provide insights additional 
to information already disseminated through pre- and post-trade transparency.  
Frino et al. (2010) survey the Australian Stock Exchange in the pre-reform period (between 
January 1, 2001 and December 30, 2003) when participants entering orders to the electronic 
open limit order book, SEAT, were easily identifiable.  
They report that trades executed in a raw and on the same side by the same broker 
significantly move prices.  
This is particularly true for medium sized transactions, confirming the prediction of the 
stealth-trading hypothesis. According to this conjecture, informed investors (mainly 
institutions) split large orders into smaller ones (the size should not be too small because of 
high trading costs) in order to exploit their informational advantage for long.  
In addition, the permanent readjustment of the stock value is stronger at the opening of the 
trading day (first 30 minutes) than at the closing. Indeed, during this time frame adverse 
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selection costs are relatively high. Therefore, paired unidirectional transactions by the same 
broker are more informative in an environment with higher information asymmetry. 
Thus, the observation of the order source and the order itself enables to infer the information 
profile of the investor behind the agent.  
The same conclusion is reached by Linnainmaa and Saar (2012) who find that in a non-
anonymous order-driven market, like Helsinki Stock Exchange, market participants are able 
to identify almost certainly the brokers’ orders to front-run or mimic. Indeed, transactions 
executed by brokers whose client base consists mainly of domestic institutions and foreigners 
(assumed to be relatively informed) induce a higher permanent stock price change than orders 
submitted by brokers who act prevalently on behalf of households (postulated to be 
uninformed). Broker identity succeeds in delivering insights about the originating investor, 
although the tendency of institutions to disguise their presence through a number of brokers. 
Actually, Goldstein et al. (2009)’s study of brokerage industry highlights that institutions, in 
particular the small ones, route their order flow to a limited circle of brokers.  
This kind of investors need to strike a balance between concealing their trading pattern by 
distributing volume among as many agents as possible and becoming premium clients via 
order flow bunching.  
The desire to benefit from special services like research, capital provision, expertise in trade 
facilitation, IPO allocation induces small institutions to bear higher per-share commissions 
and to have higher turnover. Only in this way they can have some possibilities to be first in 
some brokers’ size rank. Therefore, small institutions are willing to partially expose their 
trading strategy as long as they receive premium attention from a few brokers.  
Despite fierce competition from alternative trading platforms like Liquidnet, UNX, and ITG, 
which have pushed down average commissions, traditional full-service brokers continue to 
keep substantial market share in the institutional business. 
Another evidence of the fact that publishing brokers’ name increases the chances for market 
participants to correctly detect client’s trading motives is adduced by Lecce et al. (2006). 
Their findings reveal that, when there are no information asymmetries, uniformed traders are 
not much concerned about anonymity. When, instead, an information event (like a takeover 
announcement) is going to happen, trader identifiers, if shown, allow uninformed traders, 
followers and dealers to disentangle the information-driven component of order flow from the 
liquidity-motivated one.  
Since only informed traders know about the occurrence of a takeover announcement, the 
trading activity right before the event is attributable to them. Lecce et al. (2006) consider the 
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heterogeneity in the allocation of the permanent price impact among brokers as a proxy of the 
informational content that the market attaches to trades. The authors discover that the switch 
of Australia Stock Exchange to anonymous trading has led to a homogenization of permanent 
price changes across broker initiated trades, especially the block ones (the standard deviation 
of the mean price impact falls by 0,87% for all trades and by 2,85% for large transactions). 
This result suggests that, in the period preceding a takeover announcement, displaying broker 
ID codes conveys valuable signals for the detection of informed investors.  
On the same wavelength, Waisburd (2003) states that in less anonymous markets effective 
spread is tighter. This reflects lower adverse selection costs, since in a transparent 
environment insiders’ informational advantage is not sustainable.  
No significant change is, instead, found for inventory control costs, contrary to exchange 
officials’ expectation of an increase. Exchange officials assert that, when identities are 
revealed, liquidity providers face serious problems in getting rid of their inventory positions at 
a profit. 
Thus, the conclusion that Waisburd reaches on the Paris Bourse is similar to what other 
studies highlight: “broker‟s identity confers information regarding the nature of the order 
flow that he represents”.  
The inference-making ability of market participants implies certain knowledge of brokerage 
client base.  
On the NYSE trading floor
44,45
 specialists trade repeatedly with a small set of identifiable 
floor-brokers. In order to reduce the cost of asymmetric information, specialists force brokers 
to signal information-driven trades and punish those who don’t.  
The penalizations may include the provision of less attractive quotes and the impossibility to 
access to valuable services like trade facilitation and the provision of market information. The 
longstanding professional relationship that specialists establish with the relatively small 
community of floor-brokers increases the likelihood for the transgressor exchange members to 
be recognized ex-post and punished.  
In this way, brokers are induced to share their information and so to reveal trading motives 
behind their trades. As a consequence, specialists can clearly identify liquidity-motivated 
traders and charge them a tighter bid-ask spread.  
                                                          
44The bulk of NYSE trading volume isn’t routed via SuperDot system but through floor-brokers. Thus, block 
trades, which might be drawn by private information, are mainly negotiated on the floor.   
45
On the NYSE floor the identity of brokers forming the trading crowd is visible to specialists.  
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Also informed traders will enjoy better terms of trade if the reduction in trading costs incurred 
by uniformed investors stimulates the volume of liquidity trading and therefore specialists’ 
turnover.   
By encouraging the trading community to cooperate for the public good, specialists are able to 
price protect themselves on the basis of the observable broker mnemonics.  
Even when trading doesn’t take place vis-à-vis, specialists can trace out the trade originator. 
Indeed, the display book screen placed at specialists’ trading post shows in real time all the 
data that are necessary for execution of orders submitted through SuperDot order routing 
system. Besides direction, size, type (market/limit) and price (should the order be limit), the 
specialists can read the identity of the issuing member, unless the order is unattributed.  
The prolonged observation of the trading strategy associated with each specific identification 
code enables specialists to infer the trader type behind brokers’ orders.  
Chakravarty (2001) mentions, as one of the reasons why specialists might be interested in 
knowing with whom they trade, the fact that insiders’ trades could be emulated by other 
investors and this could seriously damage specialists’ profitability.  
By contrast to what most academics state, Lepone and Mistry (2011) find that, in a contest in 
which hidden limit orders are allowed, broker identifiers don’t provide further information 
than what is conveyed by undisclosed limit orders for the first 10 minutes after submission.  
In the Australian Stock Exchange, the ULOs regime applies to orders exceeding 200.000$. 
This regime implies the concealment of the order quantity on the central limit order book: a 
generic “/u” is reported instead of the size indication.  
The authors discover that, irrespectively of the broker identification regime, the submission of 
undisclosed limit orders, and in particular those aggressively priced, produces on average a 
stronger short-term price change than disclosed limit orders. This may indicate that current 
prices don’t incorporate a new information event.  
In sum, even if with some marginal exceptions, the majority of empirical researches conclude 
that anonymity leads to a reduction in price efficiency: informed investors are less likely to be 
noticed and thus less information is impounded into prices.  
Yet, anonymity prevents market participants to link the market impact of an order to the 
issuing broker’s fame.   
After all is said and done, broker identity coupled with pre- and post-trade transparency 
enables to form more precise guesses about motivation driving trades.  
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2.4 Is the removal of broker identification beneficial for the market? Who benefits the 
most? 
The anonymity literature is very broad and varied. It encompassed studies relying on:  
 theoretical/empirical models;  
 quote-driven/order-driven/hybrid markets;  
 once-off regulatory intervention altering broker identity disclosure/comparison of 
parallel markets which differ in the degree of anonymity;  
 disclosure or concealment of liquidity providers/demanders’ identity.  
According to me, the most effective way to conduct the concerned literature review is 
classifying academic papers based on whether they survey a change in the dissemination of 
pre-trade, post-trade or both pre- and post-trade ID information.  
 
2.4.1 Pre-trade information about broker identifiers and market quality. 
The investigation of the issue at hand should start from the illustration of some 
enlightening theoretical studies. Although surveys of this type are, more often than not, 
unable to replicate the actual traders’ behavior and the conjectures on which they rely are 
often unrealistic, their findings are used by much of the empirical literature to corroborate its 
results. 
Rindi (2008) envisions a centralized, order-driven market where risk-averse informed and 
uninformed traders supply liquidity to noise traders.  
The informed market participants can act either on exogenously acquired information, the so-
called insiders, or on endogenous costly information released by analysts. Two different 
trader identity disclosure systems are considered: anonymous and transparent trading regimes. 
In the market where trading occurs anonymously neither order volume nor trader ID 
mnemonics are disseminated. Thus, uninformed traders revise their expectations about the 
future asset value on the basis of the signal extracted from the market clearing price.  
This signal, however, is biased because under anonymity uninformed traders are not able to 
establish whether the price impact has been produced by a liquidity imbalance, hedging 
activity of informed trades or by insider trading.  
Under transparency, market participants have access to order flow, traders‟ identification and 
market price information. In a transparent regime, uninformed traders learn from informed 
traders’ demand and become “quasi-informed”: the adverse selection and risk-bearing costs 
are consequently mitigated. They are able to identify liquidity traders and, therefore, they are 
willing to accommodate their demand.  
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The impact of a noise trader’s order is softened, signaling an increase in liquidity. This result 
is obtained provided that the number of informed/insider traders is given, that is, insider 
trading regulation is easily circumvented.  
When, instead, insider trading is effectively restricted, the number of informed agents is 
endogenously determined and transparency ultimately worsens liquidity. Since information 
rapidly leaks out, its (costly) acquisition is no more convenient and informed traders are 
forced to exit the market. Given that informed agents are the most efficient liquidity 
providers, the negative effect on liquidity outweighs the positive impact arising from “quasi-
informed” uninformed traders. 
Besides liquidity, Rindi (2008) investigates other two market quality proxies: informational 
efficiency and volatility.  
Informational efficiency (measured as the inverse of the variance of the liquidation value of 
the asset conditional on the signal extracted from the price) is greater under transparency, 
provided that insider trading is not effectively banned. This is due to a reduction in the 
uncertainty about the future value of the asset as the equilibrium price conveys a more 
accurate signal.  
Less clear are the effects of transparency on volatility, which is expressed as a function of a 
price impact indicator, the variance of informed traders’ signal, endowment shocks46 and 
noise. Volatility can either rise as a result of more informative uninformed traders’ orders or 
fall because transparency reduces the price impact of noise traders’ orders. The prevailing 
effect is contingent on the parameter specification.  
However, the author highlights that the more uninformed traders in a market, the higher the 
odds that transparency will exacerbate volatility. These findings are predicated on the 
assumption that the number of informed traders is constant. 
Rindi (2008) concludes its study about pre-trade transparency with the analysis of the 
potential impact at the market participant level.  
When information acquisition is exogenous, both noise and uninformed traders’ welfare is 
positively affected, while informed traders incur losses. By contrast, when information 
acquisition is endogenous, only uninformed traders enjoy transparency. While informed 
investors are bound to exit the market, noise traders suffer from liquidity drain.  
In sum, pre-trade disclosure of trader identity and order-flow always benefits uninformed 
investors and damages informed ones when acting as liquidity providers.  
                                                          
46
Endowment shocks produce a form of noise that informed traders use to hedge against the risk of information 
leakage in a transparent environment.  
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Madhavan (1996) constructs a similar model to Rindi (2008): an auction market where risk-
averse strategic traders can submit either limit or market orders, cleared at a single market 
price. Like Rindi (2008), the author sets off a transparent trading mechanism against an 
opaque, fully anonymous regime.  
In this framework, however, transparency doesn’t imply indiscriminate pre-trade publication 
of the entire order-flow but only of the price insensitive (liquidity-motivated) component. In 
particular, the market has access to information about order imbalances which can originate 
from: derivatives expiration, the amassment of small retail orders submitted via electronic 
order routing systems or large aggressive orders of uninformed traders who opt for sunshine 
trading. The concept of pre-trade transparency used by Madhavan (1996) embraces both 
trader identity disclosure and open limit order book.  
Besides liquidity traders, the market is populated by speculators/market makers whose reason 
for trade is either information about the fundamental value of the asset or portfolio hedging.  
One aspect that is important to mention is that each market participant considers other trader’s 
strategies when deciding the utility maximizing tactic to pursue.  
The author’s findings debunk the conventional wisdom that the disclosure of pre-trade 
information generally enhances market quality. Madhavan, in fact, discovers that it can make 
traders more reluctant to share their information with the rest of the market and therefore 
more likely to refrain from trading.  
In other words, transparency can lead to a sort of market failure.   
As far as volatility and liquidity are concerned, the dissemination of information (including 
broker identifier) on a pre-trade basis produces mixed results. On the one hand, speculative 
traders dampen temporary shocks by satisfying price insensitive traders’ demand.  
On the other hand, they magnify the impact of order imbalances by making their strategy less 
reactive to price changes. In addition, speculative traders reduce their demand of portfolio 
hedging, increasing the precision of forecasts about the fundament value of the asset and 
mitigating volatility.  
Nevertheless, the author succeeds in identifying two cases in which one of the two effects 
prevails. In highly competitive markets, transparency does mitigate volatility and boost 
liquidity. In sufficiently thin markets, instead, noise reduction increases the effect of 
asymmetric information, thereby exacerbating price volatility and worsening liquidity.  
While the impacts on volatility and liquidity are not always clear, pre-trade transparency 
unambiguously increases price informativeness.  
Thus, Madhavan (1996)’s theoretical research sheds light on the reasons why: 
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 Floor-based systems are the typical “habitat” of active securities, while inactive stocks 
are often traded in anonymous limit order book systems; 
 The benefits of communicating the uninformed status may not be sufficient in 
inducing liquidity traders to engage in sunshine trading. In thin markets, pre-
announcing liquidity trading intentions implies higher execution costs compared to 
non-disclosure. This is because of greater price instability that comes with uninformed 
traders’ revelation. The instability signals the expectation that the asset value will be 
significantly different from trade price. 
 Circuit breakers, temporarily shutting down trading in the event of a large order 
imbalance, may not produce the desired effect of better quality execution prices and 
mitigated volatility.  
Another theoretical model is developed by Benveniste et al. (2003) who consider a non-
anonymous exchange where a risk-neutral specialist acts as the counterparty of every trade. 
More specifically, he takes the other side of market orders submitted by brokers on behalf of 
their customers. Brokers’ clients may be informed or uninformed.  
The ongoing dealings with the broker community allow the specialist to identify which 
members usually represent liquidity traders and which, instead, act as agents of privately 
informed investors. The result is reduced asymmetric information. 
The specialist exploits its identification ability to price discriminate: brokers that in the past 
behaved as informed are charged a wide bid-ask spread, while brokers reputed to be 
uninformed are granted price improvements.  
Besides disadvantageous trade terms, brokers discovered to act on the basis of private 
information are subject to severe sanctions by the specialist. These punishments leads to 
greater information efficiency as non-cooperative brokers are encouraged to reveal their 
informative status. Finally, provided that the elasticity of liquidity traders to transaction costs 
is high, informed traders enjoy an increase in welfare too.  
Thus, Benveniste et al. (2003) sustain the superiority of (non-anonymous) floor-based trading 
system versus electronic anonymous system.   
The analysis of the main theoretical literature strands enables us to conclude that: 
 In quote driven markets, pre-trade dissemination of traders’ identity makes prices 
more informative about the fundamental value of an asset and can improve all traders’ 
welfare; 
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 In order-driven markets, either the effectiveness of insider trading rules or the degree 
of competitiveness in a market plays a dominant role in shaping the effects of pre-
trade (ID and LOB) transparency on market quality proxies.  
In the first case uninformed traders and informed traders always profit and loose, 
respectively. In the second, instead, liquidity traders may not always benefit from 
sunshine trading;  
  
Many researchers don’t base their results on conjectured markets but they use observed data 
to test specific hypothesis.  
Their goal is to capture the real world complexity that theory is not able to model.  
Some of those academics are Foucault et al. (2007) who empirically study the consequences 
of concealing liquidity providers’ identity prior to trading in an electronic order-driven 
market. Their unit of analysis is the Euronext Paris and, in particular, CAC40 stocks which, 
despite other shares, experienced a pure shift toward pre-trade anonymity.  
In fact, before 23 April 2001 (the regulatory intervention day), trading these securities has 
always been post-trade anonymous.  
This empirical study aims at assessing the impact of anonymity on market liquidity and on the 
information content of the limit order book. The starting point is the intuition that limit order 
book provides insights on future volatility. This information, in fact, provides the basis for the 
pricing decision of limit order traders. The higher the expected future volatility is, the less 
aggressive limit orders should be: in this way, speculators are prevented from exercising 
incorporated free options when limit orders have become stale.  
This logic would imply the ability of bid-ask spread size to reveal the magnitude of future 
price changes. The evidence corroborates this hypothesis.  
The model, that Foucault et al. (2007) employ to conduct their study, envisions four types of 
traders: on the supply side, pre-committed and value traders; on the demand side, speculators 
and liquidity traders.  
The authors distinguish two situations: value traders (also called dealers) possessing 
asymmetric/symmetric information about future price changes. 
Under asymmetric information, both informed and uninformed dealers provide liquidity. 
Limit orders are posted during two subsequent phases: first, pre-committed and informed 
value traders, then uniformed dealers.  
In the non-anonymous setting, the leader’s identity is known to the follower who acquires 
volatility information by observing the limit order book. Under anonymity, uniformed dealers 
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are less able to detect trading motives of “first-stage” limit order traders. They, therefore, base 
their order submission strategy on the odds that  informed dealers are operating.  
If this probability is low, a wide bid-ask spread will not be sign of high future volatility and 
consequently of high risk of being picked off. This is because the spread is probably the result 
of uninformative quotes which will induce followers to post aggressive limit orders.  
As a consequence, both quoted
47
 and effective spreads
48
 will tighten thereby improving 
liquidity.  
By contrast, if informed dealers’ liquidity contribution is high, followers will be concerned 
about a wide bid-ask spread as it conveys a strong signal of a significant future price 
movement. Uninformed dealers’ reaction will be to reduce the amount of large and small, but, 
aggressively priced limit orders.  
As a result, the introduction of anonymity will widen both quoted and effective spreads, 
although the tendency of informed value traders to enhance their aggressiveness
49
. The final 
effect will be a reduction in liquidity. 
When all dealers have equal access to volatility information, the follower will not obtain new 
insights about pending price changes from the observation of the book. Therefore, the switch 
to anonymity will not imply a change in the follower’s behavior, meaning that neither 
liquidity nor informational content of the limit order book will be affected.  
The empirical research conducted on Euronext Paris shows that the concealment of broker 
identifiers led to a statistically significant reduction by nearly 0,02 euros in both quoted and 
effective spread and a weaker correlation between bid-ask spread and future volatility in the 
post-event period.  
These results provide evidence in favor of the scenario envisioning asymmetrically informed 
value traders and low participation rate of informed dealers.  
Comerton-Forde et al. (2005) draw on Foucault’s findings about Euronext and enlarge the 
scope of the analysis to Euronext 100 stocks. In addition, the authors study other two fully 
automated order-driven markets: Tokyo Stock Exchange and Korea Stock Exchange.  
While the former removed broker id mnemonics alongside each limit order on June 30 2003, 
the latter started to reveal the names of the five largest brokers by trading volume in each 
stock on October 25 1999.  
                                                          
47
Foucault et al. (2007) compute a time-weighted quoted spread (or small trade spread).  
48
The effective spread (or large trade spread) is computed as twice the absolute difference between the 
transaction price and the midpoint of the best bid and ask price five seconds before the transaction. The effective 
spread diverges from quoted spread when a marketable order walks up or down the book.  
49
 In non-anonymous markets, informed liquidity suppliers quote larger spread than necessary (bluffing) when 
they perceive a limited free option risk. The aim is to reduce expensive competition from uninformed value 
traders.  
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In line with Foucault’s study, Euronext and Tokyo Stock Exchange witnessed a significant 
reduction of both the time-weighted relative bid-ask spread
50
 and effective spread of orders
51
 
(after controlling for stock price, trading volume and volatility) following the introduction of 
pre-trade anonymity. Thus, liquidity increased thereby enhancing market quality.  
However, one aspect needs to be highlighted: the conclusions drawn for Tokyo Stock 
Exchange are not purely determined by a switch to pre-trade anonymity.  
In fact, on June 30 2003 pre-trade transparency was extended by increasing the volume of 
orders disclosed by two price ticks.  
As far as Korea Stock Exchange is concerned, wider post-event bid-ask spreads signal lower 
liquidity and, therefore, poorer market quality.  
Finally, Theissen (2003) finds empirical evidence of the price improvement hypothesis 
modeled by Benveniste et al. (2003). The author investigates the floor of the Frankfurt Stock 
Exchange where trading takes place through the “Makler” whose role is comparable to those 
of NYSE specialist.  
The research relies on the conjecture that non-anonymity (i.e. observation of brokers’ identity 
before trade) provides the Makler with the ability of recognizing traders who are more likely 
to be informed. The specialist’s inference ability may arise either from the analysis of 
counterparty’s actions or from the reputation developed in past trading relationships. 
The Makler, therefore, uses this knowledge to protect herself against the risk of adverse 
selection by offering the quoted spread to brokers servicing privately informed traders. 
Instead, brokers judged to act on behalf of uninformed investors enjoy more favorable trading 
conditions i.e. the inside spread. 
However, price discrimination may also result from broker self-selection. When executing an 
information-driven transaction, two conflicting issues need to be addressed: compliance with 
the best execution duty and the preservation of a good reputation vis-à-vis the specialist.  
In order to deal with this trade-off, the broker gives up obtaining price improvements for her 
informed clients and accepts the quoted spread. This “passive” behavior, however, is 
completely admissible in the sense that no breach of broker’s agency obligations to her clients 
occurs. In this way, the broker earns a good credit with the Makler who will offer in exchange 
better-than-quoted terms on liquidity-motivated trades. 
                                                          
50
The relative bid-ask spread is equal to the bid-ask spread over the midquote. Foucault et al. use this measure of 
liquidity instead of the absolute bid-ask spread in order to avoid biases in the parameter estimates due to 
minimum tick size.  
51
The effective spread of orders allows for orders whose size exceeds quoted depth or which are granted price 
improvements. It is computed as the difference between the volume-weighted average price and the quote 
midpoint over the quote midpoint. This ratio is then multiplied for a coefficient taking value 1 for orders that 
walks up the book and -1 for orders that walks down the book.  
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Anyway, the source of price discrimination doesn’t alter the hypotheses to test.  
The first hypothesis postulates that favorable trade terms are explained by lower adverse 
selection costs and, therefore, don’t deter Makler’s profit. This view contrasts with Rhodes-
Kropf (2001)’s market power model. According to these academics, price improvements are 
due to greater bargaining power of investors toward the specialist who witnesses a reduction 
in market making profitability.   
The data on Frankfurt Stock Exchange confirm the first conjecture.  
Thiessen (2003) discovers a negative non-linear relationship between price improvement, 
expressed in percentage terms of the quoted spread, and transaction size. This finding is 
consistent with the belief that large transactions are likely to be information motivated.  
Not surprisingly, the extent of price improvement results to be positively correlated with the 
size of the quoted spread. The wider the spread quoted by the specialist in response to high 
adverse selection risk, the more advantageous the trading terms applied to the subsequent 
transaction if originated by an uninformed counterparty.  
Thus, these results provide evidence of information as one of the reason for specialist‟s price 
discrimination. By contrast, Thiessen’s empirical analysis rules out a market power 
explanation as it shows that the Makler’s profit, measured as realized spread, is positively 
(instead of negatively) affected where price improvement is granted.  
The second hypothesis relies on the presumption that the specialist offers the quoted spread to 
counterparties deemed privately informed and states that transactions executed at the 
prevailing spread are supposed to move prices more than transaction executed at the inside 
spread. The evidence supports this conjecture.  
The ultimate conclusion that Thiessen reaches is that the more susceptible a stock to adverse 
selection, the higher the benefits from non-anonymity. It follows that the Floor should be the 
preferred trading platform of less liquid shares. This is exactly what happens in Frankfurt 
Stock Exchange.  
In anonymous electronic trading systems, where adverse selection risk is particularly high, 
uniformed investors are seriously damaged.  
 
2.4.2 Post-trade information about broker identifiers and market quality 
To my knowledge, very few research papers isolate the effect of changes in post-trade 
broker identity disclosure regime on market quality. Yet, they all relate to electronic order-
driven equity markets.   
Friederich et al. (2011)’s empirical study belongs to this strand of literature.  
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These authors consider the once-off regulatory intervention, which took place in London 
Stock Exchange in February 2001. That month passed through the annals of the LSE’s history 
for the introduction of a central counterparty in the electronic equity trading platform SETS.  
Until then, only pre-trade anonymity has been guaranteed. Following the rule change, traders‟ 
identities were hidden even after execution.  
At the outset of their investigation, Friederich et al. distinguish two theoretical views 
explaining the potential effects of anonymity on liquidity.  
The first is the asymmetric information theory, which yields conflicting results.  
On the one hand, under exogenous information acquisition, liquidity is negatively affected by 
post-trade anonymity, as it emphasizes the adverse selection problem (Huddart et al, 2001). 
On the other, under endogenous information procurement, liquidity and informational 
efficiency are boosted by counterparty identity concealment, since traders are encouraged to 
collect new information (Rindi, 2008).  
The second theory, instead, relies on order anticipation arguments.  
Order anticipation strategies are based on the exploitation of order flow data to detect a 
pending large order and consist in either front-running or adjusting quotes adversely for 
investors. Therefore, order anticipators are not interested in understanding the motivation 
driving trades but they need to know about the existence of an order capable of exerting a 
significant price pressure.  
The anticipated trader is penalized in terms of higher execution costs. 
In a post-trade non-anonymous market, traders with large market share and frequently trading 
on the same side are the most susceptible to order anticipation. In order to reduce such a risk, 
they increase the aggressiveness and the speed of execution and switch to the demand side.  
As a consequence, spreads widen and the book becomes thinner.  
By contrast, under anonymity, large traders are less likely to be anticipated and, therefore, 
engage in more patient execution leading to abundant liquidity. 
Friederich et al.'s empirical study highlights a reduction of almost 20% in inside spread at the 
best and fifth limit price and an increase in the cumulative depth up to the fifth best price. 
These findings signal a liquidity improvement and, consequently, do not provide support to 
Huddart et al.’s thesis.  
Furthermore, small (with high information asymmetries) and high concentration stocks 
witness the largest increase in liquidity under anonymity. This is inconsistent with 
asymmetric information theories. In particular, Rindi (2008) predicts a reduction in liquidity 
for stock with large exogenous information asymmetries.  
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The inconsistency is further proved by the fact that neither a strengthening of asymmetric 
information nor a change in informational efficiency is observed after the switch to post-trade 
anonymity.  
Strong evidence is, instead, found for the order anticipation hypothesis. As this theory 
postulates, the data show large broker-dealer order flow concentration and positive correlation 
in direction. In addition, small cap stocks (whose characteristics enable order anticipators to 
easily identify repeated traders) see greater liquidity improvements than large cap stocks 
under post-trade anonymity.  
Another implication of the order anticipation theory is that anonymity should favor low depth 
stocks than high depth stocks, since the former are more likely to exert price pressure.  
This pattern is confirmed in the data with a spread reduction of 20% in shares with the least 
depth. Finally, large and repeatedly trading investors (whatever their informational profile) 
enjoy the greatest welfare increase because of the reduced market impact that their trades 
produce, when broker identifiers are concealed. Lower, in fact, is the chance for order 
anticipation.  
A peculiar investigation is conducted by Pham (2013) on the Korean Stock Exchange.  
The uniqueness of this study stems from the examination of the implications on the Korean 
Stock Exchange when a reduction in post-trade anonymity occurs in another segment of the 
Korean Exchange
52
 i.e. the KOSAD Stock Market.  
Prior to this rule change, only the trading protocol of the investigated market imposed real-
time publication of the identities of the five most active (buy and sell) brokers, by cumulative 
trading volume, in every stock.  
The aim of the study is to assess the impact on two specific market quality proxies: the 
permanent and transitory price impact of transactions. The permanent price effect captures the 
information content of trades and is measured as the signed difference between the quotation 
midpoint at the time of the trade and quotation midpoint in effect 30 minutes after the trade. 
The transitory price effect is the price change attributed to price pressure or liquidity costs and 
is estimated subtracting the current price to the quotation midpoint at the next trade. 
The results show more informative buy and sell trades in the post-event period. Particularly, 
uninformed trades produce greater permanent price impact than informed ones.  
Pham explains this finding using Rindi (2008)’s reasoning: the observation of broker 
identities enables uninformed traders to become “quasi-informed”.  
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 The Korean Exchange is partitioned into three segments: Korean Stock Exchange, KOSDAQ Stock Market 
and Korea Futures Market.  
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The homogenization of the transparency level throughout the Korean Exchange is argued to 
mitigate the migration of informed traders toward opaque segments of the exchange. As a 
consequence, faster price discovery is achieved in the Korean Stock Exchange.  
As far as temporary price effect is concerned, no unambiguous conclusions can be derived. 
On the one hand a reduced impact is observed for sell trades (especially the informed ones), 
signaling an increase in liquidity. On the other, a greater transitory price change is recorded 
for buy trades after the regulatory event.  
Thus, Pham concludes that revealing the identity of the five largest brokers post-trade has 
been a good choice in terms of enhanced market efficiency.  
One last research isolating post-trade anonymity effects is performed by Hachmeister et al. 
(2010). They survey the electronic trading platform XETRA of the Frankfurt Stock Exchange 
around the implementation of the central counterparty system.  
The direct consequence of such innovation is the impossibility for traders to be identified 
post-trading. Given that broker mnemonics were already unobservable alongside unexecuted 
orders, full anonymity was introduced.  
To assess the potential market quality consequences of the new policy, Hachmeister et al. 
avail themselves of a unique indicator directly provided by Deutsche Börse AG: the XLM. 
The latter is an all-in-one parameter; it captures three dimensions of liquidity: market breadth 
(or width), market depth and immediacy in execution. The fourth dimension, resiliency, is 
still measurable via XLM but requires an observation of the parameter over time.  
The mechanism, by which XLM proxies liquidity, relies on the concept of implicit transaction 
costs. Indeed, it consists in summing up the liquidity premium computed as half bid-ask 
spread and the adverse price movement expressed as the price impact of an order walking up 
or down the book. The result captures the round-trip cost of executing a given size order.  
Besides liquidity, the authors want to investigate how informed trading in an instrument
53
 is 
affected by the introduction of post-trade anonymity. To this end, they employ the EKOP 
model which estimates the probability of informed liquidity demanders to arrive in the 
market. 
Both univariate and regression analysis provide evidence of lower order book width (i.e. a 
decline in liquidity premium by around 25%), larger order book depth (i.e. a decline in 
adverse price movement) and enhanced overall liquidity (i.e. a reduction in XLM).   
Surprisingly, the share of informed trading is found to be negatively affected by the 
introduction of post-trade anonymity. This is inconsistent with what theoretical and empirical 
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 The results of empirical analysis are based on a sample of DAX 30 instruments. These instruments are very 
liquid and resemble CAC40 stocks.  
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literature predicts: informed traders are better off under anonymity, as it prevents costly, 
endogenously acquired information to rapidly leak out.  
Such unexpected result may be due to the fact that EKOP model releases information about 
the arrival rate of liquidity takers and not liquidity providers.  
The increase in overall liquidity and the unmodified information environment suggest that 
informed traders might have changed their behavior by switching to the supply side.  
As Foucault et al. (2007) states, under anonymity, informed liquidity providers don’t need to 
quote larger spread than appropriate in order to avoid free-riding by uniformed quote setters. 
This is why liquidity premium declines in the post-event period.  
 
2.4.3 Pre-trade and post-trade information about broker identifiers and market quality. 
For sake of completeness, I would like to conclude my literature review by mentioning 
the findings of a few academics who consider simultaneous implementations of pre- and post-
trade anonymity in fully electronic order driven markets.  
The Australian Stock Exchange’s policy not to display brokers’ names before and after 
trading is investigated both by Comerton-Forde et al. (2009) and Pham et al. (2013).  
The authors, however, reach different conclusions.  
From a market quality perspective, Comerton-Forde et al. (2009) support the rule change as it 
produced a tightening of time-weighted proportional bid-ask spread and a significant decline 
of the effective spread of orders. The latter result signals deeper limit order book and 
consequently lower price impact of large market orders after the shift to full anonymity. 
Furthermore, a reduction in order aggressiveness is observed. This is explained by the fact 
that the concealment of broker ID codes prevents the recognition of motivations driving 
trades; thus, informed and uninformed trades are less exposed to the risk of being front-run 
and picked-off, respectively.  
The stock by stock results show that large and more active shares enjoy greater liquidity 
improvements than small stocks, following anonymity implementation. Indeed, the 
decomposition of the effective half spread highlights smaller price impact component for 
liquid stocks, signaling lower adverse selection costs, and larger realized spread for illiquid 
shares. The latter finding is due to trader’s reduced ability to communicate to the market their 
inventory adjustment needs, when trading occurs anonymously in stocks subject to severe 
adverse selection problems.  
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Comerton-Forde’s study is particularly innovative because, besides the impact on traditional 
market quality proxies, it also investigates how the competition between downstairs and 
upstairs market is affected.  
On the Australian Stock Exchange, a broker intermediated off-exchange market for block 
trades, portfolio special crossings and priority crossings operates parallel to the limit order 
book. The execution of a priority crossing requires prior display of orders in the main market 
at the crossing price for minimum 10 seconds.  
Thus, the observation of broker identities in the book is fundamental for counterparty search, 
for private negotiation and also for the sustainability of the internalization activity offering 
protection against order exposure risk.  
That’s why, after the switch to anonymity, the downstairs market has started to attract more 
order flow than the non-anonymous upstairs market. In this case we talk about liquidity 
consolidation. Evidence of this phenomenon is also provided by an increase (although not 
significant) of Australian Stock Exchange’s trading volume compared to the transparent New 
Zealand Stock Exchange. These findings hold for stocks with low adverse selection risk. 
Anonymity, therefore, can affect investors’ market selection decision and in a fragmented 
trading environment is used by exchanges to manage competition for large stocks and offer 
tighter spreads.  
Comerton-Forde’s results contrast with those of Pham et al. (2013) who discover that, after 
the removal of broker identities both pre- and post-trade, the limit order book loses order flow 
toward off-exchange markets and that the change in spread is negligible. This divergence may 
be due to the fact that Pham et al. use instrumental variables to deal with endogeneity and 
don’t perform a stock by stock analysis. 
In addition, the authors find that market efficiency is higher in a transparent environment i.e. 
stock prices take a random and unpredictable path.  
Finally, I report the outcomes of a very interesting study conducted by Comerton-Forde et al. 
(2011) on Toronto Stock Exchange. The peculiarity of this empirical analysis comes from 
many aspects. First, the investigated market hasn’t undergone any once-off policy change but 
it has always granted traders the possibility to submit unattributed (or anonymous) orders
54
.  
In other words, anonymity is not a regulators’ choice but is the result of market participants’ 
volition. 
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 These orders remain without broker attribution even in post-trade phases. 
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Second, the authors are the first to identify the factors influencing the anonymity decision. 
Broker type, order source, aggressiveness of order placement and spread size are its primary 
determinants.  
As far as order source is concerned, agency brokers, who mainly trade on behalf of their 
clients, generally opt for anonymity when submitting non-core orders i.e. proprietary and non 
client orders. Dual traders, instead, are more likely to submit anonymous core orders i.e. 
proprietary and institutional orders. Finally, specialists
55
 and option market makers prefer to 
use unattributed orders when performing the market making function.  
Market makers generally conceal their identity when trading aggressively on the basis of 
short-lived information about future volatility
56
. The combination of anonymity and 
aggressiveness is valuable to specialists also when they need to promptly alter their inventory 
position. By contrast, they prefer to reveal themselves to the market when acting as patient 
liquidity providers (their traditional function).  
Agency and dual capacity brokers, instead, are less likely to attach ID attribution to non-
aggressively priced orders. The motivation driving this choice is either long-run exploitation 
of an informational advantage or pick-off risk mitigation (in the case of non-urgent liquidity 
traders). 
Lastly, spread size influences the anonymity decision of agency brokers and market makers. 
The larger the spread, the lower the willingness to advertise their names. Indeed, when 
information asymmetry is high, front-running and piggybacking by informed traders are more 
likely to occur. In such a circumstance, anonymity helps to prevent this from happening.  
A third aspect that distinguishes this study from previous literature is the fact that a further 
consequence of anonymity (other than impossibility for the market to use broker mnemonics 
to infer the informational profile of investors) is considered.  
In fact, random orders determine larger future price impacts, if submitted anonymously rather 
than non-anonymously. The difference in price impact ranges from 1 to 11 basis points.  
This is because the use of anonymity may signal the presence of a trader for whom the non-
attribution option is valuable: typically informed investors.  
However, if anonymity is the result of a strategic choice (taken on the basis of order 
attributes, market conditions and unnoticeable features like information and trading strategy), 
traders will enjoy lower execution costs than in the case of attributed orders.  
                                                          
55
 On the Toronto Stock Exchange each listed firm has a designated specialist who makes the market in a fully 
electronic continuous auction system. This explains the hybrid nature of TSX.  
56
 Specialists may have access to order flow information not yet publicly available. For example, they may have 
insights about the existence of pending orders, which are shopped in the upstairs market.  
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Only some TSX members succeed in taking advantage of strategic ID concealment: 
particularly, market makers. These traders, probably, have free access to anonymity and they 
may hold information or pursue a trading strategy whose success relies on the impossibility to 
be recognized by the market.   
Brokers, instead, may encounter some restrictions in the submission of anonymous orders. 
Sometimes they must follow client’s attribution requirements57 or they desire to enjoy the 
advertising benefits arising from identity disclosure. This may explain the authors’ finding 
that most of the traders decide to reveal themselves to the market, notwithstanding the option 
to conceal their identity. 
As far as market quality is concerned, Comerton-Forde et al. (2011) argue that anonymity 
doesn‟t deter liquidity under endogenous information acquisition.  
On the one hand, uninformed traders are reluctant to supply liquidity in anonymous 
environments, since these markets are likely to draw informed trading. On the other hand, 
informed traders are encouraged to look for additional fundamental information and, 
therefore, provide further liquidity.  These two effects counter-balance each other.  
In addition, the effects of anonymity on informational efficiency are mixed.  
Since the strategic selection of anonymity mitigates price impact, it reduces the speed with 
which information is incorporated into prices and consequently market efficiency. Such a 
result holds ceteris paribus i.e. with unchanged number of informed traders, information 
environment and aggressiveness in order placement.  
In the meantime, anonymity may lead to more informative prices:  
 it may incentivize traders to collect more information about the fundamental value of 
assets and, 
 it may induce informed investors to switch toward least transparent markets and to 
place aggressively priced orders 
 
2.5 Concluding remarks 
The entire literature relies on the fact that broker identities do have informational 
value: they allow to attach a greater probability of informed trading to some market 
participants.  
Thus, the disclosure or concealment of broker mnemonics will affect traders’ strategies and 
ultimately market quality. Despite acknowledging the fact that policy implications crucially 
                                                          
57
 The choice to submit attributed or unattributed orders can be made by either the broker or the client. Most of 
the times it’s a broker determination.  
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depend on market-specific characteristics such as the amount of insider trading and the initial 
level of liquidity,  I still try to draw some general conclusions about the potential impacts.  
In dealer markets where trading is repetitive, non-anonymity improves market efficiency, 
since ex-post sanctions by the specialist will force informed traders to share their information 
advantage. Tighter bid-ask spread will be offered to uninformed traders, reflecting lower 
information asymmetries. Even brokers acting on behalf of informed traders may enjoy price 
improvements, should uninformed traders be very sensitive to transaction costs.  
As far as order-driven markets are concerned, most academics conclude that concealing 
broker identifiers, either before or after trading, has a mixed impact on market quality.  
On the one hand, it reduces the speed with which information is impounded into prices, 
lowering market efficiency. On the other hand, it tightens bid-ask spreads and enhances 
quoted depth, improving market liquidity.  
Two different arguments are commonly used to justify increases in liquidity. 
The first is the asymmetric information argument: disclosing the identities of brokers 
considered informed leads to information leakages. Their profits deteriorate and the incentives 
to engage in more fundamental research decrease in equilibrium. Under anonymity, informed 
liquidity suppliers quote more aggressively as there is less risk of uninformed traders free-
riding on their information.  
In limit order books where trading is concentrated among a few brokers, liquidity 
improvements are justified using order anticipation arguments: anonymity allows large repeat 
traders to produce smaller price impacts and to engage in more patient execution, since the 
chances to be exploited by order anticipators are greatly reduced.  
Thus, uninformed traders may benefit from transparency reduction in a system with repeat 
trading and strategic counterparties, contrary to the common belief in microstructure literature 
that disclosing trading intentions is always panacea for uninformed market participants. 
Innovations in financial regulation, such as the MiFID in Europe and the Regulation National 
Market System in the US, have created fragmentation, posing challenges to traditional stock 
markets. In fact, a variety of new trading venues have proliferated: electronic communication 
networks (ECNs), broker-dealer crossing networks, dark pools, and over-the-counter markets 
(OTC). In such a context, anonymity may help official markets in subtracting order flow, 
especially block trades and trading in large stocks, to off-exchange trading platforms.  
The finding that anonymity can improve liquidity in electronic limit order books is not so 
surprising if we consider that such a result is obtained in markets with already high level of 
pre- and post-trade transparency. This is consistent with what stated by Matthias Levin, 
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former fellow of the Center for European Policy Studies: “Overall, transparency is no 
panacea and there is „disquieting evidence‟ that too much transparency may harm market 
quality, as it effectively disables some liquidity provision”. 
 
In the next chapter, I am going to conduct an empirical analysis on the market quality 
implications of the introduction of a central counterparty in the Italian Stock Exchange. My 
attempt is to test the conclusions about post-trade anonymity reached by Friederich et al. 
(2011) on LSE.  
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Chapter III 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE INTRODUCTION OF POST-TRADE 
ANONYMITY ON “NUOVO MERCATO” OF BORSA ITALIANA. 
 
 
3.1 Preface 
The purpose of this chapter is to analyse how market liquidity was affected by the 
implementation in 2004 of post-trade anonymity in “Nuovo Mercato”, and what kind of 
arguments can explain this change.  
This innovation involved also Mercato Telematico Azionario which, at the same time, 
underwent the introduction of order book anonymity. Thus, it was not possible to isolate the 
effect of concealing broker identification codes in the post-trading phases.  
In Nuovo Mercato, instead, trading has been pre-trade anonymous since its creation in 1999.  
My aim is to replicate the empirical study that Friederich and Payne (2011) conducted on the 
electronic equity trading platform SETS of London Stock Exchange. 
The originality of my research stems from the fact that to my knowledge no one in literature 
identified the effects of post-trade anonymity on the Italian Stock Exchange. 
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 explains why I decided to study Nuovo 
Mercato. Section 3.3 provides some institutional details. Section 3.4 provides information 
about the regulatory intervention. Section 3.5 reports the data set and the procedure leading to 
the creation of the treated and control samples. Section 3.6 is dedicated to the model 
specification. Section 3.7 contains the discussion of the main results. The chapter ends with 
some conclusions. 
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3.2 The research question: why Nuovo Mercato? 
After the analysis of papers studying regulatory changes in transparency regime, I realized 
that few academics investigated the concealment or revelation of broker identities post-trade 
and that no one investigated Borsa Italiana’s markets. 
I found out that two stock markets, “Nuovo Mercato” and “Mercato Telematico azionario” 
underwent the introduction of post-trade anonymity in January 2004, following the 
implementation of a CCP system.  
The reason why I chose to analyse Nuovo Mercato is because MTA experienced at the same 
time (on 21 January 2004) the launch of order book anonymity. Since then, the identification 
code of the intermediary entering an order to the trading book has been concealed.  
Therefore, it was not possible to isolate the effect of post-trade anonymity on MTA’s market 
quality. In Nuovo Mercato, instead, pre-trade anonymity has been continuously guaranteed 
since its creation in 1999.  
More details about the regulatory intervention will be provided in section 3.4.  
 
3.3 Institutional details  
The origin of the market 
Nuovo Mercato was launched in June 1999 and was designed for innovative and high growth 
companies. The creation of this new equity market in the Italian Stock Exchange followed a 
European trend that involved France with the Nouveau Marché, U.K. with the Alternative 
Investment Market and TechMARK, Germany with the Neuer Markt, the Netherlands with 
Nieuwe Markt and Spain with Nuevo Mercado. These NMs were designed having in mind the 
U.S. Nasdaq, whose purpose was to support financially start-up companies. 
Since its birth, Nuovo Mercato had been part of the Euro.nm, the alliance among the new 
markets of Amsterdam, Brussel, Frankfurt and Paris Stock Exchanges. The admission and 
trading requirements were homogeneous across the members of the alliance and the 
intermediaries of one market could access to any of the other three markets by means of a 
common interface.  
Firms listed on Nuovo Mercato operated in high-tech manufacturing, Internet, 
biotechnologies, telecommunications industries or in “conventional” businesses with product, 
process or logistics innovations.  
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Before the event, on 31 December 2003, 43 firms were listed and the market capitalization 
totalled 8,3 billion euro (1,7% of total capitalisation of equity markets). At the end of 2003 
the average daily trading volume was around 56 million euro
58
. 
 
The end of the Nuovo Mercato Era 
After the resounding success achieved at the debut, in 1999, and in the first months of 2000, 
the market underwent the negative effects of the burst of the Dot.com bubble, and gradually 
fell into the oblivion. As a consequence, in 2005, Borsa Italiana decided to stop Nuovo 
Mercato from operating and to create a new market, MTAX, with the same segmentation of 
MTA: Blue Chip (top-cap
59
 firm), Star (medium-cap firm committing to achieve excellence) 
and Standard (for all other medium-cap
60
 firms). This change came into effect on 19 
September 2005 and followed the dismissal of Neuer Markt in Germany which took place 2 
years earlier. 
 
Requirements for admission to listing  
Firms willing to quote on Nuovo Mercato had to comply with both formal and substantive 
requirements.  
The formal prerequisites entailed:  
 The publication and filing of financial statements for minimum one year; 
 Venture capital institutional investors’ ownership of at least 10% of the share capital, 
should the firm be operating for less than 3 years. This sine qua non, however, would 
not have been necessary if the firm arose from entity restructuring operations 
(mergers, spin-offs etc.) or if it was already listed on another regulated market; 
 Net equity equal to or larger than 3 million euro; 
 Free float held by the public or institutional investors not less than 30% of the share 
capital; 
 An IPO of at least 5 million euro (at least 100.000 shares) of which 50% new issues;  
 Lock-in clause relating to 80% of shares held in IPO for a year. 
The substantive requirements, in turn, called for: 
 Above average revenue growth; 
 Consistent business plan; 
                                                          
58
 The data were published by Borsa Italiana in the BItStat report of December 2003. 
59
 Top cap firms encompass companies with market capitalization larger than 1 bln euro. 
60
 Medium-cap firms have a market capitalization in between 40 mln and 1 bln euro. 
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 Clear definition of the business model and of the competitive scenario; 
 Skilled and motivated management team; 
 The orientation toward value creation and communication (Investor Relator); 
 Compliance with the Voluntary Self-Regulatory Code of listed companies. 
The financial instruments admitted to trading included shares, warrants, option rights and 
convertible bonds.  
 
Continuing requirements for listed companies 
The permanence of firms on Nuovo Mercato called for the compliance with organizational 
and disclosure requirements.  
From an organizational perspective, the issuing company was required to elect a Sponsor and 
a Specialist in the secondary market.  
From a communication perspective, instead, every financial year, CONSOB, Borsa Italiana 
and the public were granted access to information concerning: 
 The financial statements, directors and auditors’ reports. These financial documents 
had to be made available from the day immediately after the approval of the annual 
financial statements; 
 The semi-annual report which had to be released no later than four months after the 
closing of the first semester of the year; 
 The quarterly reports. This duty was to be complied for by 45 days after the end of 
each quarter of the financial year. 
Furthermore, the Specialist was required to publish two surveys on the issuing firm and to 
promote at least two meetings with the financial community.  
 
Admitted intermediaries 
The intermediaries admitted to operate in Nuovo Mercato were required to comply with 
listing and continuing requirements established by the “Regolamenti dei mercati di Borsa 
Italiana” and by the “Testo Unico della Finanza” (Legislative Decree No. 58 of 1998). 
Under a law perspective, the admission application could be submitted by: 
 Exchange brokers (only dealing on client’s account); 
 National, EU and extra-EU banks; 
 National, EU and extra-EU investment firms; 
 Locals with registered office in one of the EU Member States (only dealing for own 
account); 
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 Poste Italiane Spa, authorized by Presidential Decree 144 of 2001 to provide trade 
services on behalf of clients. 
All intermediaries authorized to operate on the market actively took part to the price 
formation process with proprietary orders and/or clients’ orders. The fairness of treatment was 
ensured by the market microstructure: orders were executed according to price and time 
priority which were the primary and secondary order precedence rules, respectively.   
 
The market microstructure  
Nuovo Mercato was an electronic order-driven screen-based market characterized by the 
mandatory presence of specialists. Specialists undertook to continuously quote bid and ask 
prices and to promote the dissemination of analyses on the issuers. They had to expose all 
orders until a minimum daily quantity was traded. 
The specialist’s liquidity commitments for the year 2004 are reported in figure 3.1. 
 
 
 
Intermedaries could enter limit orders, market orders and trading proposals at the auction 
price (PDN) along with validity conditions (VSC = valid till cancellation, VSD = valid till a 
specified trading day, VAC = valid in the closing auction only) and execution conditions 
(EEC = fill and kill, EQM = minimum execution size, TON = fill or kill, ECO = execute 
anyway and hidden limit orders). Trading proposals had to include at least the information 
concerning the financial instrument, the quantity, the trade direction (buy or sell), the account 
type (propietary or client) and pricing conditions. 
Market orders could be submitted as long as there was at least an opposite trading proposal 
with price limit. 
Figure 3.1 Source: Toscani, D.,  Bosetti, L., “Struttura e funzionamento dei mercati azionari di Borsa Italiana “, 8 May 2004 
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The trading model entailed an opening auction (from 8:00 a.m. to 9:10 a.m.), continuos 
trading (from 9:10 a.m to 5:25 p.m.) and a closing auction (from 5:25 p.m. to 5:40 p.m.). 
Trading could also take place after hours (TAH) in a continuous way from 6:00 p.m. to 8:30 
p.m.. The execution of orders followed the price-time priority rule. Furthermore, a privilege 
of 5 minutes was granted to the specialist when trading institutional orders.   
A trading suspension or an extention of the pre-auction phase occurred if the price violated 
specific parameters set out by the “Divisione Vigilanza Mercati” according to liquidity of the 
financial instrument, the information and the events potentially affecting price discovery.  
These parameters were expressed as static or dynamic ranges centered on a benchmark price 
which was either the control price
61
 or the last trade price. A revision of these ranges took 
place in consideration of particular market trends. 
As far as market transparency is concerned, intermediaries had real time access to the 
following information: 
 In the pre-auction phases: reference price, control price, theoretical auction prices, 
overall tradable and non-tradable quantity at these theoretical prices; 
 During continuous trading: the entire order book, a summary of trading terms for each 
financial instrument (trading parameters, market phase, reference price, control price, 
opening price, last trade price, the best ask price and the best bid price, total traded 
volume), a recap of the their own arranged trades and of their trade proposals and, 
finally, a summary of the trades arranged on the market for every financial instrument. 
The public, instead, was provided with the following data: 
  In the pre-auction phases: the theoretical opening price and the relative available 
volume, the best bid and ask prices and the volume available at those prices, the 
control price and the quantity available at the 5 best price levels; 
  During continuous trading: the best bid and ask prices and the volume available at 
those prices, the quantity available at the 5 best price levels, last trade price, time of 
the trade and relative traded volume, cumulative traded volume and value, control 
price.  
Thus, Nuovo Mercato was characterized by high levels of both pre- and post- trade 
transparency. Since its birth, the identity of intermediaries placing orders to the trading book 
had been concealed. The impossibility to trace the origin of the order before the trade had 
been advocated as a means to strengthen market quality by enabling a more efficient price 
formation process.  
                                                          
61
 The control price is the price guiding the automatic control of trading in order to ensure a regular and 
substantial price formation process. 
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Furthermore, the participation of intermediaries actively providing liquidity would have been 
stimulated. Until 26 January 2004, the date event, post trade-anonymity was not guaranteed.  
 
3.4 The event 
During 2003 Borsa Italiana Group implemented an important post-trading innovation aimed 
at strengthening the operating efficiency of financial markets. This innovation involved the 
introduction of a Central Counterparty (CCP) system, managed by Cassa di Compensazione e 
Garanzia (CC&G), in stock markets.   
Before going into the details of this reform, I find it useful to briefly recall the security 
industry value chain with a particular focus on post-trading phases.  
Following the execution of a trade (which takes place according to specific price and time 
priority rules), the netting and guarantee processes initiate, trade terms are matched in order to 
assess whether the buyer and the seller have agreed to the same conditions and, finally, 
contracts are cleared and settled.  
A wider description of the trading stages with the specification of the actors involved is 
provided by Figure 3.2. 
  
 
 
Returning to the issue at hand, a Central Counterparty system has traditionally guaranteed 
derivatives contracts and, following 2003 reform, these guarantees have covered also cash 
equity markets. 
The CCP places themselves between the buyer and the seller of an original trade and ensures 
the proper performance of the obligations under the contract, thereby eliminating the 
counterparty credit risk. 
   Figure 3.2 Source: Borsa Italiana’s  Facts and Figures 2003 
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The CCP implementation concerned the Mercato Telematico Azionario (Electronic Share 
Market), the Nuovo Mercato and the respective Trading After Hours segments. This change 
occurred in two stages: 
1.  The very first step towards the new trading arrangement was made on 23 May 2003. 
It involved the confirmation that the obligations arising from the contracts introduced 
in the Daily Trade-Checking system (sistema di Riscontro e Rettifica Giornaliero) 
were guaranteed by the CCP. At that time, post-trade anonymity was not already 
introduced, since the bilateral balances provided to the settlement system remained 
identifiable. 
2.  The second and final phase, started on 26 January 2004, is the one in which the most 
dramatic changes were implemented.  
 
Now, the CC&G results as the counterparty of every trade and, therefore, bilateral balances 
remain anonymous since the entering of the contract into the RRG system.  
Furthermore, a process of flexibilization of the clearing and margining system was activated, 
enabling: 
  Direct members of the guaranty system to participate indirectly to the 
settlement system; 
  Indirect members of the guaranty system to directly join the settlement system; 
  The possibility for direct participants to opt for the so-called “cross 
margining”, that is, a margining that combines cash and derivative positions; 
  The possibility for direct participants to ask for the separate computation and 
payment of margins for each market. 
 
The superiority of the CCP system over the old system based on mutual guarantee funds is 
proved by three main features. First, the margining methodologies are in line with the 
international best practices. Second, intermediaries are required to provide an amount of 
guarantees consistent with the risk they are exposed to. Third, the counterparty risk 
(unconstrained under the mutual guarantee funds system) is completely eliminated.  
 
The CCP guarantee system relies on four pillars: 
1. Membership requirements: the direct or indirect membership to CC&G is a pre-
requisite for trading on the markets where a CCP system operates. The direct 
participants must comply with specific organizational and capital parameters;  
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2. Margining system: members are required to provide collateral in an amount sufficient 
to fund the theoretical settlement costs that CC&G would incur in the worst case, 
should one of the participants default on outstanding contracts; 
3. Default fund: in the case in which the initial margin set up by the defaulter is 
insufficient to meet the amount owed, the CCP can use the defaulter’s quota of the 
default fund to cover the loss. All members must contribute to this fund prior to using 
the CCP; 
4. Capital and financial resources: Should one of the direct members fail to perform its 
obligations, the CCP can draw on its own equity resources under certain 
circumstances and according to a precise sequence.  
 
In the event of a Clearing Member default, the CCP has at its disposal a number of safeguards 
that shall be used in the following order:   
1. Initial Margin of the defaulter 
2. Defaulting participant’s default fund contribution 
3. Quota of CCP’s capital up 5 million euro 
4. Default fund quota of non-defaulting clearing members 
5. Additional CCP capital quotas 
 
The introduction of the Central Counterparty system was driven by the general thinking that it 
would have boosted liquidity by ensuring the safeness and the stability of the trading 
framework. The removal of the counterparty risk and the concealment of identities post-trade 
would have induced local intermediaries to enhance their trading activities and, at the same 
time, it would have drawn foreign operators.  
 
3.5 The data  
3.5.1 Data source 
For each stock, daily trade and quote information was obtained from Thomson Reuters 
Datastream Database.  
Unlike Friederich and Payne, I had access to very few intraday data and, thus, I used end-of 
day values instead of average values most of the times.  
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3.5.2 The sample period 
The sample period includes fourteen months before (290 trading days) and six months after 
(129 trading days) January 26 2004, the event date. More specifically, I defined the pre-event 
period as the time interval from 1 November 2002 to 31 December 2003, and the post-event 
period as the time span between 1 February 2004 and the 31 July 2004.  
I discarded the month of January 2004 since in that period some tests took place to assess the 
new trading procedure. Over the observation period no change in the level of pre- and post-
trade transparency occurred. In fact, the MiFID I directive entered into force only 3 years 
later.  
 
3.5.3 The main sample 
The sample of stocks undergoing the introduction of post-trade anonymity (“treated sample”) 
is made up of 11 out of 43 stocks quoted on Nuovo Mercato during the sample period. The 
remaining stocks were not included because the database Datastream provided either no data 
at all or insufficient information to run the regressions necessary to conduct my analysis. 
 
 
MONDO TV
CDC POINT
REPLY
DADA
EL.EN.
TREATED SAMPLE
FASTWEB
TISCALI
CAIRO COMMUNICATION
ESPRINET
DATALOGIC
CAD IT  
 
The firms included in the sample operate in the technology and telecommunications industry 
and their average market values (computed over the sample period) range from around 67 
million euro (EL.EN.) to around 1,9 billion euro (FASTWEB).  
The sample companies represent about 67% of total market capitalization of Nuovo Mercato 
as at 31 December 2003, and 80% of total traded value over the year preceding the event. 
Table 3.1 – The treated stocks 
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Table 3.2 shows that stocks under observation are heterogeneous both in terms of liquidity, 
and in terms of turnover by value. In fact, TISCALI experienced a mean inside spread of 
around 17 basis points, whereas CDC POINT’s spread reached on average 103 basis points. 
As far as trading activity is concerned, EL.EN’s stocks were the least traded over the sample 
period with an average daily aggregate traded value of 56 thousands euro. By contrast, 
TISCALI’s stocks were the most traded with a mean total traded value of 24 million euro.  
 
Std. Dev. Min 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu. Max
INSIDE SPREAD  (in bps) 25,26 17,13 38,63 60,13 60,13 81,63 103,1
MARKET CAPITALISATION (in mn of euro) 547,47 66,61 540,4 1.014 1.014 1.488 1.962
AGGREGATE TRADED VALUE (in thousands of euro) 6.993,30 56,06 6.112 12.170 12.170 18.220 24.280
Summary statistics for the treated sample
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.5.4 The control sample 
By control sample, I mean a group of stocks that didn’t experience any change in the 
intermediary identity disclosure regime over the sample period.  
To build such a sample, I followed the procedure used by Friederich and Payne. In particular, 
I picked control shares from the StoxxEurope 600 index that includes large, medium and 
small capitalization firms across 18 European countries.  
For comparability reasons, I selected only the constituents operating in the same industries as 
the firms included in the treated sample: technology and telecommunications sectors.  
Afterwards, I discarded those stocks that were traded on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange’s 
XETRA and on Mercato Telematico Azionario (i.e. TELECOM ITALIA and 
STMICROELECTRONICS) because they underwent the introduction of a CCP system in 
March 2003 and in January 2004, respectively. 
The group of stocks I was left with was made up of 12 candidate firms: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.2 - The above liquidity and trading activity measures are averaged for every stock across the sample 
period. By inside spread, I mean the end of day difference between the best bid and ask prices divided by the 
midpoint. Market capitalization is computed as the stock’s end of day price multiplied by the number of 
ordinary shares in issue. The aggregate traded value is the value of all trades occurred on particular day. 
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ASML HOLDING
NOKIA
DASSAULT SYSTEMES
CAP GEMINI
ALCATEL - LUCENT
ATOS
INGENICO GROUP
ASM INTERNATIONAL
CANDIDATE                                    
CONTROL SAMPLE
TELEFONICA
ORANGE
KPN KON
ELISA
 
 
Because of the observational nature of my study (i.e. the treatment that each stock receives is 
determined beyond the control of the investigator), treatment selection may be influenced by 
stock’s baseline characteristics. Large differences between the treated and control groups in 
observed baseline characteristics may lead to biased estimates of treatment effects.   
A method used to reduce or eliminate the effects of measurable confounding when using 
observational data is the propensity score matching. This technique makes use of the so called  
propensity score, defined by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983a) as “the conditional probability of 
assignment to a particular treatment (Zi=1) given a vector of observed  covariates (xi)”:  
e(xi)=pr(Zi=1| Xi=xi) 
The propensity score has the property to be a balancing score because, conditional on the 
propensity score, the observable covariates present homogenous distribution within the treated 
and control groups.   
Propensity score matching involves creating matched groups of treated and untreated units 
presenting similar propensity scores. Thus, it allows to balance the distribution of measured 
baseline characteristics in the treated and control sample and to replicate a mini-randomized 
experiment at least with respect to the covariates. 
There are several ways of matching treatment cases to control cases based on propensity 
scores:  
 (Greedy) Nearest neighbor, which selects for each treated individual units the control 
unit with the closest propensity score. When using the nearest neighbor matching, it is 
also possible to select the number of good matches for each treated units (i.e. every 
Table 3.3  – The unmatched control stocks 
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treated unit is matched with two or more control units sharing the most similar 
propensity score), especially when the control sample is larger than the treated sample. 
In this case we talk about ratio matching. Another decision is whether matching 
should be “with” or “without replacement”, that is, if some control units can or cannot 
be used as a match for multiple treated units. The matching with replacement is the 
most effective in reducing selection biases and enhancing the average quality of 
matching. This option should be allowed for when the distribution of propensity 
scores between main and control groups diverges: for instance, when there are many 
treated units with high propensity scores and a large number of controls with low 
propensity scores.  
 Optimal matching, which finds the closest control match for each treated units and at 
the same time tries to minimize the average absolute distance
62
 across all matched 
pairs.  
 Sub-classification, which divides the data set into sub-groups within which measured 
covariates have similar distribution conditional on the propensity score; 
 Full matching, which is a more advanced type of sub-classification that generates 
matched sets made up of one treated unit and at least one control. Within each sub-
group the weighted average of the estimated distance between each treated unit and 
each control unit is minimized.  
 Weighting, where propensity scores are used directly in the outcome analysis. In 
particular, they serve as inverse weights in the estimation of the average treatment 
effect (Inverse Probability of Treatment Weighting).  
 
To derive a matched control sample for the conduct of my study, I availed myself of the 
package MatchIT offered by the statistical software R
63
.  
When estimating the propensity scores I used the logistic regression, and I considered as 
covariates the stock’s end of day market capitalization and the daily aggregate traded value 
averaged across the pre-event period.  
For a covariate to be included, the following property needs to be satisfied: correlation with 
the outcome variable and, eventually, with the treatment assignment. In fact, the absence of 
                                                          
62
 In the case of propensity score matching, the distance is defined either as Dij=|ei – ej| or as Dij= |logit(ei) –
logit(ej)|, where ei is the propensity score of unit i and ej is the propensity score of unit j. 
63
 MatchIT is used to perform causal inference when a dichotomous treatment variable (i.e. a variable that takes 
value 1 if the unit receives treatment and 0 if the units receives control) and a series of pre-treatment observed 
baseline features are available. 
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Table 3.4  R output showing the effectiveness of the propensity score matching procedure 
the association with the treatment assignment exerts only a negligible negative effect on the 
quality of the propensity score estimation.  
Since the allocation of the treatment (post-trade anonymity) is not under my control, I am not 
able to establish whether a relation with the chosen covariates exists, but I can rely on 
theoretical arguments to assess the existence of some kind of relation with the outcome 
variable (inside bid-ask spread).  
Market capitalization is generally assumed to be inversely related to bid-ask spread, since 
firm size can be thought to be a proxy of asymmetric information.  
Similarly, turnover by value is typically positively correlated with bid-ask spread because 
liquidity is on average higher on high activity days. 
As matching technique, I used the “Nearest Neighbor” method, setting as options: 
 “with replacement”: the same control unit can be used as a match for more than one 
treated unit. Replacement is generally preferred because it allows to obtain a less 
biased estimate of the treatment effect than “without replacement”; 
 “ratio=2”: a treated unit can be matched with up to 2 control units having the closest 
probability to receive treatment conditional on the pre-treatment covariates. I 
activated this option because the candidate control sample was a bit larger than the 
main sample.   
 
 
 
 
Source: author’s elaboration 
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The matching procedure is aimed at generating a dataset that resembles as much as possible 
the one arising from an experimental study, which holds the desirable property of 
randomization. Once this similarity is achieved, the treatment variable and the pre-treatment 
covariates are no more linked. This occurs only if the control variables present close 
distribution within the matched treated and control sample.  
The closeness of covariate distributions is called “balance” and is the basis on which the 
effectiveness of the matching procedure is assessed.  
Table 3.4 reports the summary of the balance for the entire and matched data-set, the 
percentage balance improvement after matching and the composition of control and treated 
groups before and after matching. 
The balance statistics for the propensity score (distance) and the two covariates (M= market 
capitalization and V= aggregate traded value) include: 
 the weighted mean in the treated and control groups; 
 the standard deviation computed in the control sample; 
 the difference in mean between treated and control groups; 
 the mean, median and maximum distance between the empirical quantile function of 
the treated groups and the empirical quantile function of the control group. 
 
The results show that the propensity score matching was successful for this dataset.  
As shown in the summary of balance for all data, before matching, the stocks experiencing the 
introduction of post-trade anonymity presented a smaller mean market capitalization by 16 
billion euro and a lower mean aggregate traded value by 100 million euro than the control 
stocks.  
After matching, however, the differences in means significantly decreased. As far as market 
capitalization is concerned, the difference in means reduced by almost 98% (see percentage 
balance improvement) reaching about 335 million euro. Similarly, the difference in means of 
the aggregate traded value declined to 5 million: a reduction approaching 95%. 
Furthermore, the matching procedure led to the creation of quite homogeneous matched 
treated and untreated units in terms of propensity score (distance): the difference in means is 
switched from 56% to 8%. 
All Quantile-Quantile (Q-Q) plot differences take smaller values after matching, meaning that 
the empirical distribution of covariates between the two groups has become more similar.  
In the end, 5 out of 12 candidate control stocks served as a match, whereas no treated stock 
remained unmatched. 
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Table 3.5  Distribution of Propensity scores (Jitter Plot) 
The balance can be assessed not only through numerical summaries but also using graphical 
diagnostics.  
 
Source: author’s elaboration 
 
Table 3.5 shows a jitter plot that illustrates the overall distribution of propensity scores in the 
treated and control sample. Each circle corresponds to a stock’s propensity score and its size 
depends on the weight attributed to that stock. The weight is proportional to the number of 
treatment units to which it was matched.  
If we look at the chart, we will realize the reason why 7 control units remained unmatched: 
their conditional probability of being subject to post-trade anonymity approached 0%, 
compared to an average 77% (see Table 3.4) of matched treated units.   
In other words, the main sample stocks mainly lie on the right side of the graph, whereas the 
unmatched untreated items principally cover the lefts side. 
As you can see, the two matched control stocks with the highest propensity score (i.e. 
INGENICO GROUP and ASM INTERNATIONAL) were given a greater weight (the size of 
the circle is wider), meaning that they were used as a match for more than one-treated stocks. 
This is because their likelihood to be assigned to treatment was comparable to the majority of 
treated stocks. Conversely, the remaining stocks received a smaller weight, since their 
propensity scores were similar to only a few units of the main sample. 
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Table 3.6 Density Distribution of Propensity scores (Histogram Plot) 
Another graphical check of whether observed systematic differences between the two groups 
have been removed consists in plotting the histogram of the distribution of the propensity 
scores pre- and post-matching. 
 
 
 
Source: author’s elaboration 
 
To gauge the overall balance improvement, we need to first compare the distribution of the 
estimated propensity scores in the original main group versus the original comparison group 
(left side of the chart). Then, we need to compare the distribution in the matched treated units 
versus the matched control units (right side of the chart).  
In the pre-matching stage the density histograms look opposite, signaling a poor covariate 
balance: the Nuovo Mercato stocks present a distribution skewed to the right, whereas 
StoxxEurope 600 constituents present a distribution skewed to the left.  
In the post-matching stage this situation has improved. The right hand side plots, which are 
created using the weight resulting after matching, show almost even distributions.  
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Table 3.7  Empirical Quantile-Quantile plots of each covariate (market capitalization and aggregate traded value) 
 
Source: author’s elaboration 
 
Table 3.7 reports four QQ plots, two for each covariate: one built using the entire data set and 
one using only the matched items. 
The Empirical Quantile-Quantile plots show the covariate values that fall roughly in the same 
quantile of the treated and control distributions. The Nuovo Mercato stocks’ quantile values 
are reported on the vertical axis, whereas the StoxxEurope 600 constituents’ quantile values 
on the horizontal axis
64
.  
In this case, before matching, both market capitalization and turnover by value present 
different distributions in the treated and control groups. More specifically, the majority of 
points lie below the “ideal” diagonal, signaling that treated units generally take lower value of 
covariates than control units.  
After matching, covariates present approximately the same quantiles in both groups. Again, 
the comparison of the charts on the left side with the charts on the right side shows a 
remarkable balance improvement. 
Another evidence of the effectiveness of the matching procedure is provided by the plot (table 
3.8) of the absolute standardized difference in means
65
 of each covariate for all the data and 
matched data. 
Each point in the graph represents either one of the two covariates or the distance (propensity 
score). The improvement stands out. In fact, although the scale of the chart doesn’t allow to 
                                                          
64
 If all the points lie on the 45 degrees line, the empirical distributions of the two groups are equal. By contrast, 
if the points lie far from the diagonal, deviations exist. 
65
 The standardization is obtained by dividing the difference in means for the standard deviation in the treated 
group. 
Treated Units 
Control Units 
Treated
 U
n
its 
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Table 3.8 Plot of the standardized difference in means of  the covariates and the distance 
Table 3.9 Summary of  the standardized difference in means of the covariates and the distance 
see where the absolute standardized difference in means of the two covariates for the entire 
dataset stands, the line linking the points pre-matching and post-matching is very steep. For 
the numerical summary of the standardized difference in means see table 3.9. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: author’s elaboration 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: author’s elaboration 
 
In sum, all balance diagnostics both graphical and numerical provide evidence of the fact that 
the applied procedure has led to the selection of well-matched samples of the original treated 
and control groups, thereby decreasing biases due to covariates. 
In the end, all Nuovo Mercato stocks have found a match, whereas only 5 out of 12 
StoxxEurope 600 constituents will be used for follow-up analysis: 
Distance 
Market capitalization 
Turnover by value 
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As table 3.11 shows, the firms included in the final comparison group operate in technology 
and telecommunications industries and their average market values (computed over the 
sample period) range from around 301 million euro (INGENICO GROUP) to around 3,7 
billion euro (CAP GEMINI). The stocks are heterogeneous both in terms of liquidity and 
turnover by value. In fact, CAP GEMINI experienced a mean inside spread of around 11 basis 
points, whereas ELISA’s spread reached on average 67 basis points. As far as trading activity 
is concerned, INGENICO’s stocks were the least traded over the sample period with an 
average daily aggregate traded value of 1,3  million euro. By contrast, CAP GEMINI’s stocks 
were the most traded with a mean total traded value of 45,7 million euro.  
 
Std. Dev. Min 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu. Max
INSIDE SPREAD  (in bps) 16,60 11,20 25,20 39,20 39,20 53,20 67,20
MARKET CAPITALISATION (in mn of euro) 960,85 301,1 1.133 1.965 1.965 2.796 3.628
AGGREGATE TRADED VALUE (in thousands  of euro) 12.798,85 1.384 12.470 23.550 23.550 34.640 45.720
Summary statistics for the control sample
 
 
 
 
3.6 The model specification. 
My study relies on the empirical research conducted by Friederich and Payne (2011) who 
analyzed the equity trading platform SETS of LSE around the introduction of post-trade 
anonymity in 2001.   
The objective of their study was to assess the impact that this event had on market quality and 
in particular on liquidity. In order to perform such evaluation, they built a treated sample of 
132 SETS stocks and a control sample of 155 StoxxEurope 600 stocks. The observation 
period included 6 months before and after the CCP implementation. 
INGENICO GROUP
ASM INTERNATIONAL
CAP GEMINI
ATOS
MATCHED                  
CONTROL SAMPLE
ELISA
Table 3.10 
Table 3.11 - The above liquidity and trading activity measures are averaged for every stock across the sample 
period. By inside spread, I mean the end of day difference between the best bid and ask prices divided by the 
midpoint. Market capitalization is computed as the stock’s end of day price multiplied by the number of ordinary 
shares in issue. The aggregate traded value is the value of all trades occurred on particular day. 
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Friederich and Payne used as unit of analysis the following liquidity measures: daily time 
weighted inside bid-ask spread, daily time weighted bid-ask spread at the fifth limit price and 
average daily depth available at those spreads.  
Unfortunately, Thomson Reuters Datastream Database provided only data concerning spreads 
at the best quotes and so I had to limit my analysis to this measure of liquidity. 
I applied the same model employed in Friederich and Payne’s research, a panel model with 
difference-in-difference specification, with some adjustments due to unavailability of some 
data (eq. 1): 
 
Si,t= αi+ β1Vi,t + β2RVOLi,t + β3LogMKTCAPi,t + ϒ1Di
Treat
 + ϒ2Dt
Anon
 + ∆ Di,t
Treat x Anon
 + єi,t 
(1) 
 
The dependent variable, Sit, is the daily closing bid-ask spread for stock i on day t expressed 
in basis points. This spread is computed as the difference between the best bid and ask prices 
quoted at the close of the market each day, divided by the mid-quote.  
In this case the databases didn’t allow me to compute a daily time weighted average like 
Friederich and Payne. However, it is not unusual to use daily closing prices instead of 
intraday prices: for example, this approach was followed by Acker et al. (2002) when 
investigating the behavior of inside spreads around corporate earning announcements in 
London Stock Exchange.  
 
As far as the explanatory variables are concerned: 
 Vi,t is the value of all trades for stock i on day t expressed in money terms. The 
aggregate traded value was rescaled by the number of shares of stock i traded on day t 
in order to increase comparability across securities. I extracted the turnover by value 
and turnover by volume from Datastream datatypes
66
 VA and VO, respectively. The 
more actively a stock is traded, the stronger is the competition among traders, 
improving bid and ask prices. As a consequence transaction costs, measured by bid-
ask spread, decline. Thus, the coefficient β1, which represents the correlation between 
spread and aggregate traded value, is expected to be negative. 
 
 RVOLi,t is the realized volatility of stock i on day t. In measuring stocks’ daily 
realized volatility I followed the approach used by Comerton-Forde et al. (2005): 
                                                          
66
 Datastream datatypes are acronyms identifying specific financial/accounting data. 
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                                                    RVOLi,t                                     
 
where High is the highest price of stock i achieved on day t (Datastream datatype PH) 
and Low is the lowest price of stock i achieved on day t (Datasteam datatype PL). 
When stock volatility is high, rapid price changes are more likely to occur within the 
short run. Traders, in particular day traders who prefer to lay off their inventory by the 
end of the trading day, may heavely loose to informed trades when trading at narrow 
bid-ask spread. This is due to the fact that privately informed traders trade 
aggressively in the short run because of high price volatility.  
Day traders, therefore, protect themselves against such adverse selection risk by 
quoting wider bid-ask spreads when market volatility is high. Thus the coefficient β2, 
which represents the correlation between bid-ask spread and stock level volatility, is 
expected to be positive; 
 
 LogMKTCAPi,t  is the logarithm of market capitalization of stock i at the end of day t. 
The information about market capitalization was extracted from Datastream datatype 
MV, which returns the result of the multiplication between the price of each shares 
and the number of ordinary shares in issue on a particular day.  
Since market capitalization can be viewed as a proxy of firm size, we would expect it 
to be negatively correlated with bid-ask spread (β3<0.) In fact, large firms generally 
publish more information than small firms, and they are closely followed by the 
investment community. Consequently, prices of stocks of high market cap firms 
incorporate more information and, thus, the problem of information asymmetry is less 
severe for such firms.  
 
 Di
Treat
 is a dummy variable taking value 1 if stock i belongs to the treated sample and 
0 if stock i belongs to the control sample. The coefficient ϒ1 captures spread 
differences between treated and control group prior to CCP introduction. 
 
 Dt
Anon
 is a dummy variable taking value 1 if the observation is in the post-CCP period 
and 0 if it is in the pre-CCP period. The coefficient ϒ2 captures changes in spread over 
time in the control group;  
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 Di,t
Treat x Anon
 is an interaction term between the dummy variable isolating the treated 
sample stocks and the dummy variable indicating the post-CCP period. This 
interaction term is the variable of interest, since its coefficient (∆) is the difference in 
difference estimate of the treatment effect on the treated sample: 
 
∆ = (E[Si,t | Di
Treat 
= 1, Dt
Anon
 = 1] – E[Si,t | Di
Treat 
= 1, Dt
Anon
 = 0])  –       
                (E[Si,t | Di
Treat 
= 0, Dt
Anon
 = 1] – E[Si,t | Di
Treat 
= 0, Dt
Anon
 = 0])                             (2) 
 
It follows that the population average difference over time in the control sample is 
subtracted from the population average difference over time in the treated sample. 
Thus, the difference-in-difference methodology allows to eliminate biases arising 
from: 
 permanent intergroup differences, when comparing treatment and control 
sample in the post-CCP period and  
 time trends, not attributable to the treatment when comparing the treated group 
over time. 
 
єi,t is the idiosyncratic error which varies across individuals and over time. 
 
The fundamental assumption underlying OLS is the absence of correlation between the error 
term, incorporating any feature of the individuals not explicitly controlled for in the model, 
and the independent variables. This property is called exogeneity.  
If such correlation exists, we cannot rely on OLS estimates to make causal inference.  
I, therefore, dealt with endogeneity by using instrumental variables. In order to be used as 
instrument, a variable must be uncorrelated with the error but correlated with the endogenous 
X. In other words, it must affect only indirectly (by means of X) the outcome variable.  
Like Friederich and Payne, I used as instrumental variables the regressors lagged by two 
periods, e.g. the aggregate traded value lagged by two days.  
 
Another issue concerns OLS standard errors. To rely on OLS standard errors, the residuals 
have to be independent and identically distributed.  When running a regression on panel data, 
we should take into account the fact that residuals might be correlated across individuals and 
over time, leading to biased standard errors. In such a situation the variability and, 
consequently, the significance of coefficient estimates would be over or underestimated.  
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Therefore, for all the panel regressions that I run, I tested for serial correlation, for cross-
sectional dependence in the idiosyncratic error and for heteroskedasticity. 
 
To assess the presence of serial correlation in the idiosyncratic error
67
, I performed the 
Breusch-Godfrey/Wooldridge test. This test relies on the alternative that the error follows a 
first-order autoregressive process (AR(1)): 
Єi,t = ρ1 Єi,t-1 + ei,t 
where E(ei,t | Xi,t , Єi,t-1, Xi,t-1, Єi,t-2 ...) = 0 
Under the null hypothesis of no serial correlation, ρ1= 0.  
For every panel regression, the p-value was lower than 0.05 and, therefore, I rejected the null 
hypothesis: 
 
Breusch-Godfrey/Wooldridge test for serial correlation in panel models
68
 
data:  Y ~ X 
chisq = 510.45, df = 409, p-value = 0.0004616 
alternative hypothesis: serial correlation in idiosyncratic errors 
 
Then, I performed the Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier test for cross-sectional dependence 
to test the null hypothesis of zero error correlation across entities (in this case stocks): 
H0: Cov(Єi,t, Єj,t) = 0, for all t and i ≠ j 
In this case, for all panel regressions, I failed to reject the null hypothesis since the p-value 
was larger than 0.05. 
Breusch-Pagan LM test for cross-sectional dependence in panels
69
 
data:  formula 
chisq = 142.14, df = 120, p-value = 0.08196 
alternative hypothesis: cross-sectional dependence 
                                                          
67
  i.e. correlation between error terms from different time periods because of a time constant omitted factor. 
68, 69, 70
 These are the results of the test performed for the first regression that I run. From the qualitative point of 
view, they are similar to the results obtained for the cross-sectional regressions.  
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Finally, I checked for heteroskedasticity, i.e. non constant error variance, through Breusch 
Pagan test which tests the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity: 
                                        Var(Єi,t) = σ
2
 h(X’i,t  δ) 
Where Xi,t  is the  K-dimensional vector of explanatory variables and for the function h(.),    
h(0) = 1 and h(.) > 0 holds. 
The null hypothesis is δ=0 and, thus,  Var(Єi,t) = σ
2
. 
For all the panel regressions, I rejected the null hypothesis of homogeneity given a p-value 
lower than 0.05. 
Breusch-Pagan test
70
 
data:  Y ~ X 
BP = 115.91, df = 6, p-value < 2.2e-16 
To deal with heteroskedasticity and serial correlation in the idiosyncratic error which lead to 
biased standard errors of coefficient estimates, I used robust matrix covariance estimators 
when running the panel regressions. The robust matrix covariance estimators allow to reduce 
biases in the estimate of the standard errors due to stock and time-specific clustering.  
 
3.7 The Results 
In this section I discuss the results of the model estimation both at the market level and at a 
cross-sectional level. Before analyzing the empirical findings, I would like to briefly recall 
two theoretical views explaining the potential effects of anonymity on liquidity.  
The first is the asymmetric information theory, which yields conflicting results.  
On one hand, under exogenous information acquisition, liquidity is negatively affected by 
post-trade anonymity, as it emphasizes the adverse selection problem (Huddart et al., 2001). 
On the other, under endogenous information procurement, liquidity and informational 
efficiency are boosted by counterparty identity concealment, since traders are encouraged to 
collect new information (Rindi, 2008) 
The second theory, instead, relies on order anticipation arguments which forecast an 
improvement in liquidity because large traders are less likely to be anticipated and, therefore, 
engage in more patient execution. 
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3.7.1 Post-trade anonymity and liquidity: overall market implications. 
Table 3.12 reports the results of OLS estimation of the difference-in difference panel model.  
The regression output shows that two of the control variables accounting for time-varying 
stock specific conditions (i.e. the daily stock-level realized volatility and the daily stock 
aggregate traded value) are insignificant in explaining differences among stocks in the 
expected value of the daily closing inside spread.  
The estimated coefficient of stock daily market capitalization is negative and highly 
statistically significant: a one per cent increase in market capitalization (ceteris paribus) is 
expected to produce a decrease, although tiny, in inside bid-ask spread of about 0.002 basis 
points. This is consistent with the fact that the extent of information asymmetries is generally 
smaller for large firms.   
The estimated coefficient of the dummy variable isolating the treated sample indicates that 
when switching from the control group to the treated group in the pre-CCP period, an increase 
in daily closing inside spreads by 35 basis points is expected. The picture that emerges is in 
line with tables 3.2 and 3.11, whose comparison has highlighted a wider spread, on average, 
in Nuovo Mercato stocks.  
The estimated coefficient of the anonymity indicator shows that when we switch to the post-
CCP period, ceteris paribus, an increase of inside spreads of around 30.6 basis points is 
expected. This would signal that spreads in control stocks widened under anonymity.  
As far as the interaction term (our critical variable) is considered, we cannot conclude 
anything about the average treatment effect on the treated sample as the estimated coefficient 
is not statically significant.  
The impossibility to reach conclusions about the implementation of a CCP system at “macro-
level” suggested me to conduct two cross-sectional analyses: small cap versus large cap 
stocks and low depth versus high depth stocks. 
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Unbalanced Panel: n=16, T=409-424, N=6691 
Residuals : 
   Min.   1st Qu.  Median  3rd Qu.   Max.  
-2710.0  -1080.0     16.4 1100.0   2710.0  
Coefficients : 
Estimate Std. Error t-value  Pr(>|t|)     
 (Intercept)  40.2108702   2.892368  13.9024   < 2.2e-16 *** 
V                -0.016561     0.028704  -0.5770   0.5639943     
RVOL  -0.115674    0.125264  -0.9234   0.3558325     
LogMKTCAP    -0.205362       0.053148 -3.8640   0.0001133 *** 
TR            35.018580    15.518293   2.2566   0.0240895 *   
AN             30.579796    6.987431   4.3764   1.237e-05 *** 
TR*AN          12.868082   125.221506   0.1028   0.9181566     
--- 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
Total Sum of Squares: 1.1963e+10 
Residual Sum of Squares: 1.1527e+10 
R-Squared: 0.36456 
Adj. R-Squared: 0.36417 
F-statistic: 42.148 on 6 and 6684 DF, p-value: < 2.22e-16 
 
Table 3.12 Output of the difference-in-difference model estimation “at macro-level” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: author’s elaboration 
 
3.7.2 Post-trade anonymity and liquidity: cross-sectional implications. 
3.7.2.a  Small vs. large stocks 
I divided the treated and the control samples in 3 subgroups on the basis of the stock’s 
average daily market capitalization in the pre-event period. Then, I ran separate regressions 
for each subsample.  
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Table 3.13 shows the results of the difference-in-difference model estimation using the Nuovo 
Mercato Stocks (ESPRINET, REPLY, DADA, EL.EN.) and StoxxEurope 600 constituents 
(INGENICO GROUP and ASM INTERNATIONAL) falling in the first size tercile i.e. low-
cap securities.  
Two of the control variables accounting for time-varying stock specific conditions, i.e. 
aggregate traded value and market capitalization, present a statistically significant (at 0.01 
level and at 0.05 significance level respectively) and negative estimated coefficients. The sign 
of the coefficients is in line: 
 with the fact that the higher the trading activity, the stronger competition among 
traders and the narrower bid-ask spread and 
 with firm size proxying asymmetric information.  
The estimated coefficient of the dummy variable identifying Nuovo Mercato stocks shows 
that when switching from the control to the treated first tercile subsample in the pre-CCP 
period, an increase in inside spreads by 52.6 basis points is expected. This conforms to my 
expectations.  
The anonymity indicator highlights, ceteris paribus, an expected increase in the inside spreads 
of about 83 basis points, when switching to the post-trade anonymous regime. This would 
imply that liquidity of small cap control stocks has fallen after the CCP implementation.  
Finally, the estimated coefficient of the variable of interest suggests that the regulatory 
intervention has had a significant impact on the liquidity of small cap Nuovo Mercato stocks. 
In particular, the average treatment effect on the treated sample is a decrease in inside spreads 
of about 14 basis points.   
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Table 3.13 Results of the difference-in-difference model estimation for the first size tercile. 
 
Source: author’s elaboration 
 
Table 3.14 reports the results of the regression using equities from the second size tercile of 
the treated sample and the second size tercile of the comparison group. The Nuovo Mercato 
stocks included in the second subsample by market capitalization are MONDO TV, CDC 
POINT and CAD IT, whereas only ELISA among StoxxEurope 600 constituents. 
In this case only market capitalization shows a (borderline) statically significant coefficient 
and its sign is consistent with intuition: a one percent increase in the variable, ceteris paribus, 
is associated with an expected decrease, even if tiny, in inside spreads of about 0.004 basis 
Unbalanced Panel: n=6, T=416-424, N=2514 
Residuals : 
   Min.      1st Qu.   Median   3rd Qu.    Max.  
-1120.0     -489.0       22.1        502.0     1090.0  
Coefficients : 
                       Estimate        Std. Error         t-value   Pr(>|t|)     
(Intercept)  82.453678   6.00020   13.7418  < 2.2e-16 *** 
V      -0.051483   0.020094 -2.5622   0.0104501 *   
RVOL    0.0090291   0.113806   0.0793   0.9367670     
LogMKTCAP    -0.29156  0.172072    -1.6944  0.0934223.     
TR            52.64201 20.707265  2.5422   0.0103502*   
AN            83.387654   21.486679    3.8809   0.0001063 *** 
TR*AN      -14.170235   6.5175011   -2.1741  0.0240896 *   
 
--- 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
Total Sum of Squares:    868690000 
Residual Sum of Squares: 859600000 
R-Squared:      0.104750 
Adj. R-Squared: 0.104450 
F-statistic: 4.42297 on 6 and 2507 DF, p-value: 0.00018595 
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points. Again, the findings show that, prior to the introduction of post-trade anonymity, 
medium cap treated stocks have wider inside spreads than medium cap control stocks: the 
average differential is about 56 basis points. 
Even in this case, a reduction in liquidity of control stocks under anonymity is highlighted. 
The interaction term suggests a significant decrease in inside spreads of medium cap Nuovo 
Mercato stocks as a result of the CCP introduction. Further, the average extent of liquidity 
improvement is larger than small cap treated stocks both in basis points (30 bps vs. 14 bps)  
and as a percentage of the average pre-CCP inside spread
70
 (28.87%  vs. 10.49%).  
 
Table 3.14 Results of the difference-in-difference model estimation for the second size tercile 
 
                                                          
70
 The average pre-CCP inside spread for the treated sample is given by the sum of the estimated intercept and 
the coefficient of the dummy variable isolating Nuovo Mercato stocks.  
Unbalanced Panel: n=4, T=414-419, N=1670 
Residuals : 
   Min.  1st Qu.  Median   3rd Qu.    Max.  
-853    -369.00      4.5        362.00     808.00  
Coefficients : 
                       Estimate  Std. Error t-value     Pr(>|t|)     
 (Intercept)  47.743040   6.149363   7.7639   4.766e-14 *** 
V        0.202471    0.352546  0.5743  0.5660173     
RVOL     0.039577   0.043856    0.9024   0.3672641     
LogMKTCAP   -0.473249    0.280753  -1.6856   0.0924954 .   
TR            56.406861   26.551902  2.1244   0.0341281 *   
AN            81.222132   24.430603   3.3246   0.0009511 *** 
TR*AN       -30.070194   11.731047  -2.5633   0.0104590 *      
--- 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
Total Sum of Squares:    2987900000 
Residual Sum of Squares: 294220000 
R-Squared:      0.15281 
Adj. R-Squared: 0.15217 
F-statistic:  4.30103 on 6 and 1663 DF, p-value: 0.00025992 
 
 
 
 
Source: author’s elaboration 
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Unbalanced Panel: n=6, T=409-422, N=2507 
Residuals : 
    Min.        1st Qu.   Median   3rd Qu.     Max.  
-1090.000  -455.000    3.54    410.0       1210.0  
Coefficients : 
           Estimate  Std. Error  t-value    Pr(>|t|)     
(Intercept)     27.694913   2.238479  12.3722  < 2.2e-16 *** 
V       -0.335061     0.337966  -0.9914     0.3220     
RVOL    -0.074809     0.058351  -1.2821    0.2004     
LogMKTCAP  -0.311525    0.121112  -2.5722     0.0104602* 
TR           47.538780    6.897975   6.8917   1.728e-11 *** 
AN            61.216822    12.668179    4.8323   1.816e-06 *** 
TR*AN                  -38.707537     5.029304  -7.6964   7.955e-14 *** 
--- 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
 
Total Sum of Squares:    5811000 
Residual Sum of Squares: 4750400 
R-Squared:      0.18251 
Adj. R-Squared: 0.1799 
F-statistic: 33.1701 on 6 and 2500 DF, p-value: < 2.22e-16 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Finally, the regression outputs for high cap treated (FASTWEB, TISCALI, CAIRO 
COMMUNICATION and DATALOGIC) and control stocks (CAP GEMINI and ATOS) are 
reported in Table 3.15.  
This time around, the average treatment effect on Nuovo Mercato stocks is about 38 basis 
points, corresponding to 51.45% of the average pre-CCP inside spread. The extent of liquidity 
improvement is by far larger than medium and small cap treated stocks (28.87% and 10.49% 
of average pre-CCP spread, respectively).  
 
Table 3.15  Results of the difference-in-difference model estimation for the third size tercile 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Source: author’s elaboration 
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The cross-sectional analysis based on pre-event market capitalization suggests a global 
tightening of inside spreads following the introduction of post-trade anonymity.   
Such a result leads me to exclude Huddart (2001)’s asymmetric information argument that 
forecasts, under exogenous information acquisition, a deterioration of liquidity due to the 
strengthening of information asymmetries in the anonymous regime.  
The fact that large cap stocks appear to have benefited the most from broker identity 
concealment provides evidence in favor of the asymmetric information argument used by 
Rindi (2008). Stocks endowed with private information should experience a greater reduction 
in inside spreads under anonymity than stocks endowed with exogenously acquired 
information (typically small stocks).    
The order anticipation theory, instead, predicts the opposite: in the anonymous regime, 
repeated traders in small stocks should enjoy a larger liquidity increase than dynamic traders 
in large stocks. This is because the low trading activity that generally characterizes equities 
with small market capitalization allows anticipators to easily identify traders frequently acting 
on the same side of the market.   
 
3.7.2.b. Low vs. high depth stocks. 
I divided treated and control samples in 3 subgroups on the basis of the pre-event average 
value of stocks available at the inside spread. Then, I ran separate regressions for each 
subsample.  
Table 3.16 shows the results of the difference-in-difference model estimation using the Nuovo 
Mercato Stocks (ESPRINET, REPLY, DADA and EL.EN.) and StoxxEurope 600 
constituents (INGENICO GROUP and ASM INTERNATIONAL) falling in the first tercile 
i.e. low-depth securities. Since the treated and control subsamples by depth have the same 
composition of the subsamples by market capitalization, it is not worth discussing again the 
regression outputs. 
No one of the remaining stocks fall into the second depth tercile. The overall sample, 
therefore, contains no medium-depth shares.  
The regression outcomes for high depth treated (MONDO TV, CDC POINT, CAD IT, 
FASTWEB, TISCALI, CAIRO COMMUNICATION and DATALOGIC) and control stocks 
(ELISA, CAP GEMINI and ATOS) are reported in Table 3.17.  
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Two of the control variables accounting for time-varying stock specific conditions, i.e. 
aggregate traded value and market capitalization, present highly statistically significant and 
negative estimated coefficients. The sign of the coefficients is in line with intuition. 
The estimated coefficient isolating treated sample stocks shows that when switching from the 
control to the treated third tercile subsample in the pre-CCP period, an increase in inside 
spreads by 43.9 basis points is expected.  
Furthermore, the results show a widening of inside spreads (68 bps) in the anonymity period 
for high-depth control stocks.  
The analysis of the critical variable highlights an average treatment effect on Nuovo Mercato 
stocks of about 36 basis points, corresponding to 46.06% of the pre-event average inside 
spread.  
 
Table 3.16 Results of the difference-in-difference model estimation for the first depth tercile  
 
Unbalanced Panel: n=6, T=416-424, N=2514 
Residuals : 
   Min.      1st Qu.   Median   3rd Qu.    Max.  
-1120.0     -489.0       22.1        502.0     1090.0  
Coefficients : 
                       Estimate        Std. Error         t-value   Pr(>|t|)     
(Intercept)  82.453678   6.00020   13.7418  < 2.2e-16 *** 
V      -0.051483   0.020094 -2.5622   0.0104501 *   
RVOL    0.0090291   0.113806   0.0793   0.9367670     
LogMKTCAP    -0.29156  0.172072    -1.6944  0.0934223.     
TR            52.64201 20.707265  2.5422   0.0103502*   
AN            83.387654   21.486679    3.8809   0.0001063 *** 
TR*AN      -14.170235   6.5175011   -2.1741  0.0240896 *   
--- 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
Total Sum of Squares:    868690000 
Residual Sum of Squares: 859600000 
R-Squared:      0.104750 
Adj. R-Squared: 0.104450 
F-statistic: 4.42297 on 6 and 2507 DF, p-value: 0.00018595 
 
 
 
 
Source: author’s elaboration 
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Table 3.17 Results of the difference-in-difference model estimation for the third depth tercile  
 
Source: author’s elaboration 
 
The cross-sectional analysis based on pre-event depth suggests that all stocks experienced 
liquidity improvements, especially high depth securities. 
This is inconsistent with the order anticipation thesis: low depth stocks should take the 
greatest advantage from anonymity, since it reduces the chances to be front-run. In fact, the 
success of anticipation tactics relies on the exploitation of significant price variations that are 
unlikely to be created when the order book is adequately deep. 
 
 
Unbalanced Panel: n=10, T=409-422, N=4184 
Residuals : 
   Min.  1st Qu.  Median 3rd Qu.    Max.  
 -506.0  -207.0    2.12     175.0       504.0  
Coefficients : 
                 Estimate   Std. Error  t-value    Pr(>|t|)     
(Intercept)   35.369961    2.512999  14.0748  < 2.2e-16 *** 
V         -0.123185     0.035877   -3.4335   0.0006206 *** 
RVOL    -0.083755     0.066461  -1.2602   0.2078954     
LogMKTCAP      -0.328377     0.050786  -6.4659   1.582e-10 *** 
TR           43.959008    7.753048   5.6699  1.876e-08 *** 
AN             68.002327    17.707555    3.8403   0.0001307 *** 
TR*AN      -36.535752     9.687583  -3.7714   0.0001720 *** 
--- 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
Total Sum of Squares:    61541000 
Residual Sum of Squares: 56862000 
R-Squared:      0.7603 
Adj. R-Squared: 0.75494 
F-statistic: 33.710 on 6 and 2500 DF, p-value: < 2.22e-16 
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3.8 Concluding remarks. 
In this chapter I tried to answer the following research question: how did the introduction of a 
Central Counterparty system in 2004 affect liquidity of Nuovo Mercato?  
Due to the limited availability of data, I was compelled to restrict my analysis to a single 
measure of liquidity: inside bid-ask spread. The regression results suggest a widespread 
narrowing of spreads following the regulatory intervention.  
The introduction of post-trade anonymity occurred simultaneously to the removal of the 
default risk and the launch of Express II, a new platform aimed at increasing settlement 
efficiency. Nevertheless, the overall liquidity improvement is mainly ascribable to post-trade 
concealment of broker identities, since Hachmeister et al. (2010) state that the other two 
effects that usually accompany the CCP implementation “are only of major importance in 
futures markets”. 
The stocks that seem to have benefited the most are large cap (less subject to exogenous 
information asymmetries) and high depth shares (less exposed to order anticipation risk) 
experiencing average spread reduction of 51.45 % and 46.06%, respectively. Thus, the results 
of the cross sectional analysis would favor the asymmetric information story of Rindi (2008) 
instead of the order anticipation arguments.  
 
My study attempted to replicate the empirical research of Friederich and Payne (2011) who 
analyzed the equity trading platform SETS of LSE around the introduction of a Central 
Counterparty system in 2001.  
Their analysis highlighted a reduction of almost 20% in inside spread at the best and fifth 
limit price and an increase in the cumulative depth up to the fifth best price. 
Friederich and Payne found strong evidence in favor of the order anticipation hypothesis. In 
fact, small cap (whose characteristics enable the easily identification of repeated traders) and 
least depth stocks (more likely to exert price pressure) saw the greatest liquidity 
improvements. 
Furthermore, large and repeatedly trading investors enjoyed the greatest welfare increase 
because of the reduced market impact produced by their trades. Finally, as the anticipation 
theory postulates, the data showed large broker-dealer order flow concentration and positive 
correlation in direction. 
 
The database used didn’t provide sufficient information to test all the implications of order 
anticipation arguments and so I cannot exclude them with certainty. However, one 
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explanation of why a different theory might explain the liquidity improvement in Nuovo 
Mercato is a lower degree of order flow concentration. 
In fact, at the time of the event the top 5 intermediaries held an average market share of 
36.4% (vs. 54% in SETS) and the top 10 intermediaries held an average market share of 
57.4%
71
  (vs. 77,5% in  SETS).  
 
                                                          
71
 The data were reported on “Fatti & Cifre 2004 of Borsa Italiana”, p.77 
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CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis has focused on the third dimension of market transparency, i.e. anonymity, which 
concerns the information about the identity of brokers submitting orders either pre- or post-
trade. 
More specifically, I assessed the impact that the introduction of post-trade anonymity (the 
concealment of intermediary ID codes after trade) in Nuovo Mercato of Borsa Italiana had on 
liquidity, measured as inside spreads. This change occurred on 26 January 2004, following the 
implementation of a Central Counterparty system.  
Since the identity of brokers entering orders to the trading book has never been disclosed, 
after the event trading became completely anonymous. 
This revolution involved also Mercato Telematico Azionario which, however, underwent at 
the same time the introduction of order book anonymity. Thus, it was not possible to isolate 
the effect of post-trade anonymity on MTA’s market quality.  
 
In conducting the empirical analysis, I relied on the work of Friederich and Payne (2011) who 
studied the policy implications in the equity trading platform SETS of London Stock 
Exchange.  
Their findings highlighted a reduction of almost 20% in inside spreads at the best and fifth 
limit price and an increase in the cumulative depth up to the fifth best price  
Friederich and Payne found evidence of the order-anticipation theory: small cap (whose 
characteristics enable the easily identification of repeated traders) and least depth stocks 
(more likely to exert price pressure) experienced the largest liquidity improvements. 
Furthermore, large and repeatedly trading investors enjoyed the greatest welfare increase 
because of the reduced market impact produced by their trades. Finally, as the anticipation 
theory postulates, the data showed large broker-dealer order flow concentration and positive 
correlation in direction. 
 
My empirical study suggests an overall narrowing of inside spreads following the 
introduction of post-trade anonymity. The stocks that benefited most are large cap (less 
subject to exogenous information asymmetries) and high depth shares (less exposed to order 
anticipation risk) experiencing an average spread reduction of 51.45% and 46.06%, 
respectively.  
These results are consistent with the asymmetric information argument used by Rindi (2008).  
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Another evidence against the order anticipation hypothesis is represented by the fact that at 
the time of the event Nuovo Mercato was characterized by a low degree of order flow 
concentration. In fact, the top 5 intermediaries held an average market share of 36.4% (vs. 
54% in SETS) and the top 10 intermediaries held an average market share of 57.4% (vs. 
77,5% in  SETS).  
Thus, relying exclusively on inside spreads, the concealment of broker identities appears to 
have boosted liquidity, thereby improving market quality.  
This result is not surprising if we think that Nuovo Mercato at the time of the event was 
characterized by high levels of pre- and post-trade transparency. 
This is in line with what stated by Matthias Levin, former fellow of the Center for European 
Policy Studies: “Overall, transparency is no panacea and there is „disquieting evidence‟ that 
too much transparency may harm market quality, as it effectively disables some liquidity 
provision”. 
All the conclusions have been drawn relying on the fact that the change in liquidity is mainly 
ascribable to the increased level of anonymity. According to Hachmeister et al. (2010) this is 
not unreasonable because the other two effects generally triggered by the CCP 
implementation, i.e. removal of default risk and enhancement of settlement efficiency, are 
particularly beneficial for futures market rather than for equity markets.  
 
An interesting extension of the study would be to test the implications on bid-ask spreads at 
the fifth limit price and the depth available up to these spreads.  
Furthermore, future research might study how the introduction of post-trade anonymity 
affected the impact that trades have on subsequent prices and the execution costs of worked 
orders.  
In this way, the empirical research of Friederich and Payne (2011) would be entirely 
replicated and we would be more confident about what theoretical argument could explain the 
liquidity improvement in Nuovo Mercato.  
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